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ABSTRACT 
Head of State Immunity in International Law 
By: Mawada Siddig Yousif Abu- Agla 
The objective of this research is to examine head of state immunity in the light of 
the recent developments in the international law. In order to achieve this objective 
it was primarily essential to discuss the jurisprudential rationale of head of state 
immunity and state immunity in general by shedding a light on some of the main 
principles; secondly, to compare and contrast the leading cases that have enriched 
the doctrine of head of state immunity in order to further detect the development of 
the doctrine; thirdly, the development of the major international criminal tribunals 
and their effect on the doctrine of head of state immunity and finally the 
conclusion and recommendations that resulted from the research. 
The methodology used in this research is the comparative and analytical approach. 
This research analyzes the similarities and differences between the common law 
and continental law and within the common law the US legislation in comparison 
with the UK legislation. This research also analyzes the different court decisions 
made on the matter by the House of Lords in the UK and the International Court of 
Justice. In addition this research also analyzes the development of the international 
criminal tribunals that deal with the doctrine of head of state immunity.  
 With the establishment of the United Nations the term absolute sovereignty has 
shrunk to restrictive sovereignty. A State can no longer act as it pleases within its 
territory without being reminded by the international community to respect the UN 
Charter and international law in general. With the change in sovereignty also came 
a change in immunity granted to the state and the head of state. The change I am 
referring to is the doctrine of restrictive state immunity which came into effect in 
the nineteenth century. States were no longer absolutely immune in respect of 
commercial transactions. This change raised a question as to whether the symbol of 
sovereignty of the state reflected in its head of state had also restrictive immunity 
as regards to acts committed by him while in office, in particular international 
crimes; and if not whether the sovereignty and equality of states will be 
jeopardized once a foreign court decides to hear a case against the head of state?  
 xi
 
  ﻤﺴﺘﺨﻠﺺاﻟ
  ﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ رأس اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ: اﻟﻌﻨﻮان 
    ﻣﻮدة ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻳﻮﺳﻒ أﺑﻮﻋﺎﻗﻠﺔ: اﻹﺳﻢ
 .ﺿﻮء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات اﻷﺧﻴﺮة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻋﻠﻰاﻟﺪوﻟﺔ  أسدراﺳﺔ ﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ ر هﻮ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ هﺪف
ﺪوﻟﺔ وﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ اﻟ س اﻟﺪوﻟﺔأاﻟﻤﺒﺮرات اﻟﻔﻘﻬﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﺼﺎﻧﺔ ر ﻨﺎﻗﺶﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ هﺬا اﻟﻬﺪف آﺎن ﻻﺑﺪ أوًﻻ أن ﻧ
ﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ أهﻢ اﻟﻘﻀﺎًﺎ، ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﺛﺎﻧﻴ .ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺒﺎدئ اﻷﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ 
ﺪوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺎآﻢ اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ اﻟ ًﺎ، ﺗﻄﻮرﺛﺎﻟﺜ  .وذﻟﻚ ﻟﺘﺤﺮي ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﻤﺒﺪأ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ أسأﺛﺮت ﻣﺒﺪأ ﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ ر
اﻟﺘﻲ ﻧﺘﺞ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ  ﻴﺎتاﻟﺨﺎﺗﻤﺔ واﻟﺘﻮﺻ أﺧﻴﺮًا، .اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ أسﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ روﻣﺪى ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮهﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ 
   .اﻟﺒﺤﺚ
هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻳﻘﺎرن أوﺟﻪ اﻟﺘﺸﺎﺑﻪ و . اﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻓﻲ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ هﻮاﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎرن واﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻠﻲ
اﻹﺧﺘﻼف ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻌﺎم واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻘﺎري وﻓﻲ إﻃﺎراﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ واﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ 
 .دار اﻟﻠﻮردات ﺑﺈﻧﺠﻠﺘﺮا و ﻣﺤﻜﻤﺔ اﻟﻌﺪل اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔهﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻳﺤﻠﻞ أﻳﻀًﺎ اﻷﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﺼﺎدرة ﻣﻦ . اﻹﻧﺠﻠﻴﺰي
  . اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ أسﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ روﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮهﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ  ﺪوﻟﻴﺔاﻟﻤﺤﺎآﻢ اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ اﻟﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺶ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺗﻄﻮر
اﻟﺪول ﺣﺮة ﻓﻲ أن ﻟﻢ ﺗﻌﺪ و، ﻟﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻤﻘﻴﺪةإاﻟﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻘﺔ  ﻣﺼﻄﻠﺢ ﻣﻊ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ اﻷﻣﻢ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﺗﻘﻠﺺ
ﻣﻢ ﺬآﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺣﺘﺮام ﻣﻴﺜﺎق اﻷُﺗ دون أن إﻗﻠﻴﻤﻬﺎﺧﻞ ﺗﺘﺼﺮف آﻤﺎ ﻳﺤﻠﻮ ﻟﻬﺎ دا
اﻟﺴﻴﺎدة ﺟﺎء أﻳﻀَﺎ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺒﺪأ  ﻣﺒﺪأ آﻤﺎ ﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ. ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﺑﺼﻔﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن
 اﻟﺬي دﺧﻞ ﻤﻘﻴﺪةاﻟﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔ  اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ هﻮ  اﻟﺬي أﺷﻴﺮ إﻟﻴﻪاﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ . ﻟﺪوﻟﺔا و رأساﻟﺤﺼﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻨﻮﺣﺔ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ 
ت ﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻌﺎﻣﻼﻓﻴﺣﺘﻰ  ﺑﺤﺼﺎﻧﺔ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺔ ﺗﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺎﻟﺪول ﻟﻢ ﺗﻌﺪﻓ ،ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻨﻔﺎذﺣﻴﺰ اﻟ
ﺎ ﻤﻓﻴ ﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ا رأسﻓﻲ  اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻞﺳﻴﺎدة اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ  رﻣﺰ ﺗﻘﻴﻴﺪ ﺣﺼﺎﻧﺔﺣﻮل  ًﻻاهﺬا اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻃﺮح ﺳﺆ. اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ
ﻧﺖ اﻟﺴﻴﺎدة آﺎ نوإ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ  ،ﺟﺮاﺋﻢ دوﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻨﺼﺒﻪﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻷﻓﻌﺎل اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺮﺗﻜﺒﻬﺎ أﺛﻨﺎء وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻓﻲ ﻣ
ﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﻤﺎع إﻟﻰ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺮﻓﻮﻋ ﻣﺤﻜﻤﺔ أﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ ﻣﺎ إذا ﻗﺒﻠﺖﺘﻌﺮض ﻟﻠﺨﻄﺮ ﺗواﻟﻤﺴﺎواة ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺪول ﺳﻮف 
    .وﻟﺔاﻟﺪ أسﺿﺪ ر
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PREFACE 
The principle of head of state immunity has recently under gone series of 
serious developments, which are perhaps an outcome of a movement 
enhanced by the international community and human rights activists in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Their key objective is to put an end to 
impunity by prosecuting individuals responsible for these atrocities reflected 
in international crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide regardless of their rank even if they were heads of state. That was 
an article present in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremburg 
and Tokyo or the Far East and also the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and finally the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  
The call to impose individual criminal responsibility was settled in cases 
against a former head of states since the raison d’être behind immunity is no 
longer present and that is to ensure the sovereignty and equality of states and 
also to allow the head of state to execute his diplomatic functions effectively 
without fear of arrest.  The crucial point, however, is the movement towards 
lifting this immunity in cases of international crimes allegedly committed by 
heads of state still in office. 
This research is an endeavor towards establishing a fair understanding of the 
principle of head of state immunity and possibly to address current 
international issues on the subject. 
I chose this subject for my research because it is of great importance not only 
to legal field but also to the political field that affects the stability and 
security of states. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL RATIONALE OF HEAD OF STATE 
IMMUNITY AND STATE IMMUNITY IN GENERAL 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the jurisprudential rationale of head of state 
immunity. It will cover the principles that relate to head of state immunity in 
a quest to detect the evolution of international law, common law -in particular 
the United Kingdom and the United States- and civil law in terms of 
customary international law, international conventions, municipal law and 
case law.  
 2. Head of State Immunity 
(i) The Evolution of Head of State Immunity  
Each State determines for itself who is to fulfill the office of head of state and 
what are the exact powers attached to it. Both the nature of office – elective 
or hereditary – and the scope of the function differ vastly from state to state. 
The office entails largely symbolic functions when in the hands of European 
royalty or the German or Italian president; while in France or the US it entails 
real substantive power.1 
                                                            
1 Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International 
Human Rights Law, at.182-3 (2008). 
  2
Head of state immunity only applies to heads of state in office. Upon 
abdication a former head of state can only rely on the rule of functional 
immunity as applicable to all (former) foreign state officials. They are no 
longer shielded from foreign jurisdiction by any personal immunity, unless of 
course they are sent on special diplomatic missions by their home state. The 
consideration that heads of state lose all immunity when they leave office is 
obviously not incompatible with the operation of the rule of functional 
immunity.2  
The principle of head of state immunity originally developed from the idea of 
state sovereign immunity, as the state and its ruler used to be deemed one and 
the same. Yet the treatment afforded to heads of state and other top state 
officials has also been strongly influenced by the principle of diplomatic 
immunity, hence, the three concepts of state immunity, diplomatic immunity 
and head of state immunity have now evolved into doctrines wholly distinct 
from one another.3 
Head-of-state immunity has sought to achieve the goals of both sovereign and 
diplomatic immunity by (1) recognizing an appropriate degree of respect for 
foreign leaders as a symbol of their state's sovereign independence; and (2) 
ensuring that they are not inhibited in performing their diplomatic functions. 
Heads of state who travel abroad perform crucial and unique diplomatic 
tasks, and, therefore, a principal purpose of head of state immunity is to allow 
                                                            
2 Id., at 183 
3 Michael A. Tunks.” Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity”.52 D L J 651 at  
653 (2002) 
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state leaders freely to conduct diplomacy in foreign countries. Moreover, 
ensuring that heads of state may travel freely abroad serves the traditional 
aims of sovereign immunity, because subjecting a state's leader to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court infringes to some degree on that state's 
sovereignty. 4 
Historically, heads of state like states themselves were absolutely immune for 
acts committed either in a public or a private capacity, and therefore many 
countries felt no practical need to distinguish between head of state immunity 
and state sovereign immunity.5 But as the international community moved 
toward a restrictive form of sovereign immunity, stripping away a state's 
immunity for private or commercial acts, it became unclear whether the 
doctrine of head-of-state immunity would follow that course as well, or 
whether international law would preserve a greater degree of personal 
inviolability for world leaders. The shift to restrictive sovereign immunity 
demonstrated that the policies justifying that doctrine could in some instances 
be outweighed by other important state interests. Granting immunity to heads 
of state was justified in part by these very same policies, but also by 
functional diplomatic considerations. Consequently, nations began thinking 
about head-of-state immunity as a distinct legal concept, and recognized the 
need to reconsider the extent to which the goals of sovereign equality and 
                                                            
4  Id. at 655-676 
5 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law  at 118-119 (7th ed. 1997) cited in Id at 
656. 
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functional necessity together could justify exempting heads of state from 
judicial process abroad.6 
During the past few years, the international law of head-of-state immunity 
has evolved at an astoundingly rapid pace. No treaty has been signed to 
clarify or alter head-of-state immunity law; instead, the law has changed 
through the development of international custom. Therefore, to monitor the 
development of the customary law of head-of-state immunity, one should 
analyze how national and international courts have addressed recent 
immunity questions, how states have reacted to these decisions, what actions 
political branches have taken with respect to immunity issues, and any 
general statements nations have made about the degree of immunity enjoyed 
by heads of state. 
(ii) Distinction between Current and Former Head of State 
Recent state practice has drawn a sharp distinction between former heads of 
state and current heads of state, as courts across the world have been much 
more willing to subject former leaders to their jurisdiction.7 A recent example 
is the arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet by British 
authorities, on an international arrest warrant issued by Spain (discussed 
further in chapter 2).  
                                                            
6 Id. at 656 
7 See, e.g., Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendary Magistrate, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 205-06 (H.L. 1999) (denying 
immunity to Pinochet and allowing the extradition process to proceed on charges of torture in pursuance to a 
conspiracy to commit torture) cited in Id. at 658 
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The abrogation of immunity for the private acts of former heads of state, 
including international crimes in any context, is in harmony with the twin 
purposes of the head of state immunity doctrine: respecting state sovereign 
equality and promoting diplomatic functions. Because crimes against 
humanity, torture, and other international crimes are outside the scope of 
what can be considered a state's official public functions, seeking 
accountability for these acts does not infringe on a state's sovereignty, or at 
least not so much as to outweigh the benefits of stronger human rights 
enforcement.8 This is exactly the rationale that led to the adoption of 
restrictive sovereign immunity for states and nothing suggests that the goal of 
protecting state sovereign equality should favor a nation's head of state over 
the state itself. Furthermore, holding former heads of state accountable for 
their international crimes does not interfere with the goal of promoting 
diplomatic functions, because exercising jurisdiction over a former leader 
would not prevent current diplomats from traveling abroad and would not 
otherwise unduly disrupt international relations. 
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia9 and Rwanda 10(ICTY and ICTR) and of the International 
Criminal Court11 (ICC) also provide that sitting heads of state are not immune 
before those tribunals." United Nations (UN) former Secretary General Kofi 
                                                            
8 Id. at 660 
9 ICTY Statute Article 1993 7(2) 
10 ICTR Statute 1994 Article 6(2) 
1111 Rome Statute 1998 Article 27(1) 
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Annan echoed that the goal of the ICC is to "ensure that no ruler, no State, no 
junta, and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity."12 
Recent state practice also presents a number of examples that suggest that the 
doctrine of immunity for current heads of state is still alive and well, even 
with respect to the most serious international crimes. In March, 2001, 
France's highest court, the Cour de Cassation, held that Libyan head of state 
Muammar el-Qaddafi13 was entitled to immunity in a suit alleging that 
Qaddafi was responsible for bombing a French DC-10 aircraft in an attack 
that killed 170 people. The decision reversed a lower court ruling that had 
refused to recognize the sitting Libyan leader's head-of-state immunity. In 
Spain, the National Court decided in 1999 that it had no authority to 
prosecute sitting Cuban head of state Fidel Castro.14 Similarly, the United 
States has denied immunity to former heads of state, but has never abrogated 
the immunity of a sitting head of state or head of government. Furthermore, 
even though some international agreements have called for stripping away 
head-of-state immunity, and although some countries have considered taking 
jurisdiction over foreign leaders, it is significant that no nation has yet gone 
so far as to actually pass judgment against a sitting head of state. 
 
 
                                                            
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, UN.org, at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.html cited in  Id. at 661 
13 Gaddafi 125 ILR 490 (France, CA, Court of Cassation, 2000 and 2002)509 cited in Id. at 663-664 
14 Fidel Castro no 1999/2723 (Audiencia Naoianal, 1999) cited in Id. at 664 
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                   (iii) The Scope of Head of State Immunity in the United States 
In the United States, although the law of diplomatic immunity is governed by 
an international treaty and the law of state sovereign immunity is governed 
by an Act of Congress, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 1976, 
the responsibility for designing legal standards for resolving head-of-state 
immunity questions has been left to the courts. However, U.S. courts have 
been reluctant to play too great a role in deciding when to hold foreign 
leaders accountable for their acts, recognizing that the decision to deny the 
immunity of a foreign head of state can cause serious international political 
ramifications. In the case of Doe v. United States,15 the Second Circuit 
explained, “the judicial branch is not the most appropriate one to define the 
scope of immunity for heads-of-state . . . . [B]ecause the field of foreign 
relations is largely confided to the President by Article II of the Constitution, 
the executive branch naturally has greater experience and expertise in this 
area." When the executive branch decides that a foreign leader ought to 
receive immunity, federal courts accept this determination as binding, 
deeming it a non-justiciable political question.  Consequently, the courts may 
explore the issue of how much immunity is enjoyed by foreign heads of state 
only when the executive branch is silent. Still, as the Supreme Court has long 
emphasized, "In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the 
political branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves 
whether all the requisites of immunity exist."16  
                                                            
15 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) cited in Id. at 664 
16 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945)  at 34-35 cited in Id. at 669 
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From recent case law17, one can discern that U.S. courts will recognize the 
immunity of foreign heads of state for private unofficial acts, even when the 
executive branch does not suggest immunity, when three conditions are met: 
(1) the person seeking immunity is a sitting head of state; (2) the United 
States recognizes that person as the legitimate head of state; and (3) the 
foreign state has not waived the immunity. This rule applies to all private 
activity, from commercial behavior to international criminal offenses, and if 
any of these three criteria is not met, then the defendant is not entitled to 
immunity in U.S. courts. 18 
In the Mugabe case19, the U.S. State Department submitted an official 
suggestion to the court declaring that President Mugabe should be entitled to 
head-of-state immunity in U.S. courts. The suggestion stressed that putting 
President Mugabe on trial would be incompatible with America's foreign 
policy goals.20 Although the Mugabe court went on to discuss the domestic 
and international law of head-of-state immunity in detail, it recognized that 
no American court has ever ignored a State Department request for immunity 
for a head of state, and acknowledged that no act of Congress has overturned 
                                                            
17 In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the act-of-state doctrine 
protects officials with sovereign authority acting in their official capacity, but not officials acting privately for 
personal profit), cited in Id. at 669 
18 Id. at 669 
19 Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) cited in Id at 668 
20 Id. However, some voices within the U.S. government expressed a different view. For instance, U.S. 
Congressman Henry Hyde warned against using the doctrine of head-of-state immunity to assist a political regime 
that denied basic democratic rights to its own people. See Henry J. Hyde, U.S. Shouldn't Rush to Protect Mugabe, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2001, at 19. ("The State Department must be careful that its desire to support the tradition of 
reciprocal diplomatic immunity does not lend aid and comfort to a brutal regime's political war on its own citizens.") 
cited in supra 3 note at 674. 
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this long standing practice. The State Department's determination that 
granting President Mugabe immunity served American foreign policy 
interests was therefore wholly conclusive.  
 Applying the principles recognized by the Mugabe court, it is evident that 
President Mugabe would have been entitled to head-of-state immunity even if 
the executive branch had not pressed for it. President Mugabe served as the 
sitting head of state of Zimbabwe, he was recognized as a head of state by the 
United States government, and Zimbabwe had not waived his immunity. 
Therefore, he was entitled to travel to the United States without apprehension 
that he could be placed on trial for his private acts, including even serious 
violations of international criminal law. 
3. State Immunity  
(i) Historical Background of State Immunity  
In the nineteenth century Belgium and Italy refused to grant foreign states 
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of their courts. The restrictive 
approach to state immunity proved, however, not to be an isolated Belgian 
and Italian caprice. It spread gradually to other jurisdictions. The restrictive 
theory was reflected in scholarly efforts to codify the immunity rule. In 1891 
under Resolution of the Institut de Droit International certain proceedings 
against foreign states were declared admissible. Courts were allowed to have 
jurisdiction inter alia regarding actions connected with a commercial or 
industrial establishment or railway exploited in the territory of the forum 
state; actions arising out of contracts concluded within that territory of the 
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forum state; actions arising out of contracts concluded within that territory 
and actions for damages for a tort or quasi tort there committed.21 
The idea that states can, under certain circumstances, be subjected to foreign 
jurisdiction gained ground rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. 
It is in 1950 Austrian case of Dralle v Republic of Czechoslovakia 22 that is 
commonly hailed as the landmark of a new era. The Supreme Court, after a 
careful examination of the practice of various other states, famously stated 
that: 
The classic doctrine of immunity arose at a time when all the 
commercial activities of States in foreign countries were connected 
with their political activities… Today, the position is entirely different; 
States engage in commercial activities and enter into competition with 
their own nationals and foreigners. Accordingly, the classic doctrine of 
immunity has lost its meaning and ratione cessante, can no longer be 
recognized as a rule of international law.23   
It was not long when the common law countries adopted the restrictive 
immunity rule. Ironically common law countries -unlike continental law 
countries, enacted state immunity acts such as the US Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act 1976 and UK State Immunity Act 1978. They were shortly 
followed by Singapore, Pakistan, South Africa, Canada, Australia and 
                                                            
21 Rosanne Van Alebeek, supra note1 at 14,15 
22 17ILR 155(Supreme Court 1950) cited in Id at 17 
23 Id. at 16.17, 
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Argentina. But the courts of New Zealand, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Ireland 
have applied the restrictive theory in the absence of guidance by the 
legislature. 24 
 The prevalence of the restrictive approach is reflected in several conventions 
and the work of international learned bodies, including the European 
Convention on State Immunity1972, the UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property 2004 and also several draft 
conventions and resolutions on state immunity, like the Inter-American Draft 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States, the Resolution on State 
Immunity of the Institut de Droit 1992, the International Law Association’s 
(ILA)Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity1994, and the 
International Law Commission’s(ILC) Draft Articles on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property1991.25 
The doctrine of foreign state immunity was born out of tension between two 
important international law norms, sovereign equality and exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction. The 1812 decision of the US Supreme Court in the 
case of The Schooner Exchange V M'Faddon26 is generally held to be the first 
judicial expression of the rule of foreign immunity. In 1810 the French navy 
forcibly seized the Schooner Exchange, a ship privately owned by the US 
nationals, on its way from the United States to the Continent. The ship was 
                                                            
24Id. at 17-18   
25  Rosanne Van Alebeek supra note 1 at 19-20 
26 11US 116(US, S Ct, 1812) cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek Id. at 12- 13 
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taken to France, where it was turned into a French warship and renamed the 
Balaou. A year later the Balaou, under stress of bad weather, made a stop 
into the port of Philadelphia, the original owners of the vessel filed a claim 
before the US court, asserting their right of property. Their claim was 
dismissed on immunity grounds, and the following words of Chief Justice 
Marshall have since then been quoted in virtually every treatise on state 
immunity: 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being 
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity 
of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the 
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a sovereign territory 
only under an express licence, or in the confidence that the immunities 
belonging to his independence sovereign status, though not expressly 
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.27 
The Schooner Exchange was seen to confirm that the recognition of the 
existence of the sovereignty of the state as an abstract entity, separate and 
independent from the sovereignty of its personal ruler, entailed the 
development of the immunity concept shielding that artificial legal concept 
the state from foreign jurisdiction as well. 28    
 
                                                            
27 Rosanne Van Alebeek. supra note 1 at 12 
28 Lee M. Caplan. State Immunity, Human Rights, and  Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory .  
97A.J.I.L.741 at 745-6 (2003)  
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 (ii) Sources of State Immunity: A Comparison between Common Law 
and Civil Law  
It is necessary to ascertain the source or sources of international law that 
grant state immunity to foreign states. As mentioned above most of the 
common law countries have enacted domestic laws that grant them such 
immunity. As for continental law countries the matter is left to international 
law to determine their status. Also, a number of multilateral agreements that 
grant state immunity have been ratified by a few states. So the question of the 
position of state immunity remains in the states mainly civil law states which 
have not entered into such conventions. Hence, it was up to international law 
to find a solution which apparently leads to customary international law as 
means of enjoying immunity that must be applied domestically by national 
courts.  
A brief look at the civil law literature shows that these countries are firmly 
committed to the notion that state immunity originates in customary 
international law. Regarding state immunity, Antonio Cassese writes: 
“limitations are imposed upon State sovereignty by customary rules.”29 
Jürgen Bröhmer writes: “The law of state immunity as it now stands as a 
customary rule of international law is commonly based and justified on 
various general principles of international law.”30 Professors Cassese and 
                                                            
29  Antonio Cassese International Law at 91 (2001) cited in Id. at 762 
30 Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights at page 9 (1997) cited in Id. at 762 
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Bröhmer, like other civil law scholars, appear to accept state immunity’s 
status as international custom.31 
The rationale for the civil law position largely derives from two factors: the 
civil law constitutional design; and the lack of national immunity legislation 
in many civil law countries. Perhaps the most interesting aspect about the 
Congo V Belgium 32is its rationale for an international rule of state immunity.  
Professor Brownlie has observed: “it is difficult as yet to see a new principle 
which would satisfy the criteria of uniformity and consistency required for 
the formation of a rule of customary international law.”33 Brownlie suggests 
that the doctrine of immunity is not a rule of customary international law. 
4. Individual Responsibility as an Exception to Head of State Immunity  
The aftermath of the Second World War led to the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg annexed to the Agreement for 
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, signed on 8 August 1945. Thus, the principle of individual 
responsibility crystallized in light of this tribunal.  
The Tribunal acknowledged the concept of individual responsibility. It states: 
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the action of 
sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and 
                                                            
31  Id. at 763-4 
32 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000(Democratic Republic of Congo V Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002 3, 
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org.> cited in supra note 28 at 762 
33 Ian Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law at 333 (1979) cited in Id. at 763 
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further, that where the –person- in question is an act of State, those who 
carry it out are not personally responsible but are protected by the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal 
both these submissions must be rejected. The international law imposes 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as upon States has long been 
recognized… the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations of 
obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the law of 
war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority 
of the State, if the State in authorizing action moves outside its 
competence under international law. 
In substance the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for individual 
responsibility for serious breaches of obligations. Parties to the Conventions 
are under a duty to search for persons, regardless of their nationality, alleged 
to have committed, or have ordered to be committed a grave breach of a 
convention and to prosecute them before their own courts.34 The Conventions 
avoid the term ‘war crimes’ in relation to ‘grave breaches’, but there can be 
no doubt that the latter constitute war crimes and are concerned with 
individual responsibility for desire to emphasize the obligations of the 
contracting States to suppress and punish the acts prohibited. The imposition 
of this individual responsibility for committing international crimes as 
                                                            
34 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Conflict in the Field. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 49, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 50, Convention (III) 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 129. Convention (IV) relative 
Protection of Civilian Persons in War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 146. 
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mentioned seeks to prosecute any person regardless of his rank even if he was 
head of state.  
In the Draft Articles by the International Law Commission adopted on second 
reading, the principle of State Responsibility, though not explicitly stated in 
the text of the Articles, was clearly stated in the commentary to Article 
4(regarding attribution to the state of the conduct of persons having the status 
of state organs)35 and in the commentary to Article 7 (regarding attribution to 
the state of the conduct of state officials acting in their capacity as such but 
outside their competence or in breach of instructions received). The 
commentary to the latter Article states: 
The central issue to be addressed in order to determine the attribution to 
the State of unauthorized conduct of official bodies is whether the 
conduct was performed by the body in an official capacity or not. Cases 
where officials acted in their capacity as such are so removed from the 
scope of their official functions that they should be assimilated to those 
private individuals, not attributable to the State.36 
The commentary goes on to clarify Article 7 by stating that: 
This indicates that the conduct referred to comprises only the actions 
and the omissions of organs purportedly or apparently carrying out 
                                                            
35 Antonio Cassee. When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes. Some Comments on the 
Congo V Belgium Case. 13 EJIL (2002)853 and Wirth. Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in Congo V 
Belgium 13 EJIL (2002) 877 cited in Marina Spinedi. State Responsibility V. Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes: Terium Non Datur. 13 EJIL  (2002) at 898, Point 13 to commentary Article 4  
36 Id. at 898 
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official functions, and not the private acts or omissions of individuals 
who happened to be organs or agents of the State.37  
 Lord Millett formulated official acts as to the commission of acts of torture 
in the Pinochet no3 as, ‘official and governmental acts by any standard ’. Fox 
on the other hand pointed out that the absence of immunity for international 
crimes can only be brought about by the introduction of an exception to state 
immunity from criminal proceedings in respect of the individuals who 
commit the crimes.38 Gaeta argues that this exception exists. He stated that: 
All state officials, including those at the highest level, are not 
entitled to functional immunity in criminal proceedings- either of 
a national or international nature- if charged with such offences 
as war crimes and crimes against humanity….. 
It is apparent that this customary rule constitutes an exception to the 
general rule granting functional immunity to State organs for acts they 
perform in their official capacity. Clearly, the relationship between the 
two rules is one of lex specialis to lex generalis. 39 
Although head of States or its officials enjoy functional immunity that 
protects them from prosecution against any offence even international crimes 
in respect that the head of state or the state official are in office; yet it is 
apparent from the Pinochet case that this immunity is lifted once his term of 
office comes to an end in cases of international crimes. 
 
                                                            
37Id. at 898 
38  H Fox 696 cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek, supra note 1 at 224 
39 P Gaeta (2002) 982-3 cited in  Id. at 224  
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5. Functional Immunity (Ratione Materiae) 40 
The functional immunity of (former) foreign state officials is often 
approached as a corollary of the rule of state immunity. The reasoning of the 
UK Court of Appeal in Propend Finance v Sing41 is typical in this respect: 
The protection afforded by the State Immunity Act to states would be 
undermined if employees, officers or … ‘functionaries’ could be sued 
as individuals for matters of state conduct in respect of which  the state 
they were serving had immunity. (The relevant provision of the SIA) 
must be read as affording individual employees or officials of a foreign 
state protection under the same cloak as protects the state itself. 
(i) Kelsen’s Argument on Immunity of State Officials 
 Kelsen rationalized the immunity of state officials from the jurisdiction of 
foreign national courts in the following terms: 
No state is allowed to exercise through its own court’s jurisdiction over 
another state unless the other state expressly consents … Since a state 
manifests its legal existence only through acts performed by human 
beings in their capacity as organs of the state, that is to say, through 
acts of state, the principle that no state has jurisdiction over another 
state must mean that a state must not exercise jurisdiction through its 
own courts over acts of another state unless the other state consents. 
Hence the principle applies not only in case a state as such is sued in a 
                                                            
40 Rosanne Van Alebeek. Id.at103,105-110, 140-1,145-6,156 
41 Propend Finance v Sing (UK, 1997) 669 cited  Id  at103 
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court of another state but also in case an individual is the defendant or 
the accused and the civil or criminal delict for which the individual is 
prosecuted has the character of an act of state.42 
The immunity of the foreign state official thus appears as logical 
consequence of the principle of state immunity. It was as a consequence of 
the rule of state immunity, Kelsen argued, that state officials could not be 
held personally responsible for acts that can be imputed to the state. It is not 
difficult to see that the argument necessarily relies on the concept of act of 
state immunity. The principle of equality and independence of states limits 
the essential competence of national courts. These principles are 
compromised if jurisdiction is exercised, either directly or indirectly, over the 
exclusive competences of a foreign state.  
(ii)Non-Personal Responsibility as an Autonomous Principle Preceding 
State Immunity 
The application of the rule of state immunity to foreign state officials can be 
explained in different terms. As a rule, foreign state officials do not incur 
personal responsibility for acts committed under the authority of their home 
state. That this principle is distinct from the law of state immunity is already 
clear from the fact that state officials may be immune in cases where the state 
under the restrictive approach to state immunity is not. A claim for payment 
of, say, pencils ordered for the office a pure actum jure gestonis for the 
purposes of the law of state immunity cannot be recovered from the personal 
                                                            
42 H Kelsen, Principles of International Law (RW Tucker (ed) 2nd 1966) cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek. Id.  at 105 
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bank account of the state official that happens to have placed the order. Upon 
closer consideration, the functional immunity of forging state officials 
concerns this non-personal responsibility for acts committed as the arm or as 
mouthpiece of the home state. 
The non-personal responsibility of state officials for acts committed on behalf 
of the state may be seen to be an autonomous principle that precedes in its 
operation the application of the rule of state immunity to the facts of a case. 
While under the reasoning proposed by Kelsen the individual state official 
cannot be held personally responsible; in the autonomous variant the 
individual state official bears no responsibility in his personal capacity. 
The application of the law of state immunity to cases involving foreign state 
officials is often premised on the absence of personal responsibility of the 
state official that happened to have performed the act. Where a claim against 
a state official personally is not possible, the state is regarded the factual- if 
not the nominal- defendant when a claim against that official is instigated 
nevertheless. 
(iii) The Principle Identified 
The McLeod – or Caroline43- case is the classic example of the non-personal 
responsibility principle in practice. During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 
British forces violently captured the two counties. Within the US and 
especially along the Canadian border sympathy with and even support for the 
cause of the rebels existed. The British government maintained that the vessel 
                                                            
43 CFRY Jennings. The Caroline and McLeod Cases (1938) 32 AJIL 82 cited  Id at 108 
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was being used as a means of transport for the rebels as well as for the 
deliverance of supplies to them. The vessel was set afire and abandoned to 
the current that eventually led it to descend the Niagara falls. In the course of 
this operation two Americans were killed. The US considered the attack ‘an 
offense to the sovereignty and the dignity of the United States, being a 
violation of their soil and territory’ and demanded reparation. The UK 
emphasized that it concerned an act of necessary self- defence. The 
negotiations that ensued concentrated on the applicable principles of 
international law: the law of neutrality, the principle of non-interference, and 
the rules on self-defense. One issue was added to the negotiations when in 
November 1840 McLeod a British national was arrested while visiting New 
York. He was believed to have been one of the officials taking part in the 
seizure of the Caroline and was indicted for murder and arson.  
In the absence of the appropriate legal tools the US government proved 
incapable of compelling the state of New York to release McLeod. He was 
eventually acquitted upon proof of alibi in October 1841. 
The foreign office sought advice of the Law Officers on the merits of the 
claim. Their Report reads in relevant part: 
The principle of international law that an individual doing a hostile act 
authorized and ratified by the government of which he is a member 
cannot be held individually answerable as a private trespasser or 
malefactor, but that the act becomes one for which the state to which he 
belongs is in such case alone responsible, is a principle too well 
established to be now controverted. 
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The principle of non-personal responsibility for acts committed under 
authority of a foreign state is still regularly recognized in state practice. De 
Sena in one of the most comprehensive studies on the functional immunity of 
foreign state officials has argued that no unitary principle underlies functional 
immunity practice.44 He strongly opposes the idea that functional immunity 
necessarily follows when an individual acts in his quality of agent of the 
state. According to De Sena the fact that an individual has acted in such 
quality assumes a different relevance in different contexts. 
 (iv) Act of State as Act Attributable to the State 
Salmon and Watts45 have argued that the rule of individual responsibility for 
international crimes means that functional immunity may not be available in 
respect of these crimes regardless of their official nature. In fact, from their 
theoretical perspective the argument that international crimes do not qualify 
as official acts has highly undesirable consequences. 
Functional immunity is defeated whenever states agree that state officials 
may incur individual responsibility while engaged in the exercise of 
sovereign activity. From this perspective the absence of functional immunity 
in respect of crimes against international law is obvious.  
 
 
                                                            
44 P De Sena (1996) cf especially 96-104 cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek supra note 1 at 139-140 
45 J Salmon (1994) at 468; A Watts(1994) at 82 and 84 cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek. Id.  at 146 
  23
6. Personal Immunity (Ratione Personae)  
(i) Is Personal Immunity Granted in Criminal and Civil Jurisdictions? 
Heads of state enjoy an absolute immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction 
therefore immunity applies erga omnes as does the rule ensuring their 
inviolability. In comparison, the extent of the head of state’s immunity from 
foreign civil jurisdiction is subject to considerable academic and judicial 
controversy. Early case law involving foreign heads of state did not support a 
rule of personal immunity from civil jurisdiction. 46 
The 1916 case of Wiercinski v Seyyid Ali Ben Hamond47 did in fact make it 
clear that foreign heads of state were not entitled to additional immunity 
ratione personae from civil proceedings before French courts. The former 
Sultan of Zanzibar failed to satisfy the bills of a masseur. When civil 
proceedings were instituted against him, he argued that as a former sovereign 
he enjoyed the same immunity as a reigning sovereign and that the French 
courts should therefore refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the claim. The 
services rendered to the Sultan were qualified as belonging to the private 
rather than the public sphere and immunity was held to be absent even if he 
would be able to rely on the same measure of protection after as before his 
abdication. The same flows from the considerations of the Court of Algiers in 
Ben Aiad v Bey de Tunis48. 
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The cited cases only support immunity from civil jurisdiction to foreign 
heads of state when they have acted in their official capacity as heads of 
states. This immunity however does not follow from ratione personae 
considerations but concerns functional immunity ratione materiae and the 
consequent application of the law of state immunity. 
It was in the common law countries that the idea of immunity ratione 
personae from civil proceedings was first developed. This immunity was 
seen to protect a foreign head of state regardless of the private nature of the 
acts involved, the private purpose of his travels abroad and even when 
travelling incognito. Thus, when in 1894 the Sultan of Johore – who was 
temporarily living in the UK under the name of Albert Baker – was sued for 
breaking of his engagement to Ms Mighell, he was granted immunity from 
the civil jurisdiction of the UK courts upon revealing his true identity. 
The Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 of the UK gives effect to the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and section 20.1 of 
SIA declares the rules on diplomatic immunity equally applicable to foreign 
heads of states. Accordingly, the very limited exceptions of article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations apply. While the analogical 
application of article 31.1c VCDR allows foreign heads of states to be sued in 
relation to professional or commercial activity not related to their official 
functions and exercised in the UK, this applies to continuous commercial or 
professional activity. A foreign head of state refusing to pay for services 
rendered to him in his personal capacity, like the famous example of the 
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massages of the Sultan of Zanzibar, would be immune from the jurisdiction 
of the UK courts. 
It should further be pointed out that section 20 applies regardless of the 
official or private nature of the visit of the head of state, or in fact regardless 
of presence within UK territory whatsoever. While section 20.1 of the UK 
SIA originally provided for the application of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 
1964 to a sovereign or other head of state who is in the United Kingdom at 
the invitation or with the consent of the government of the United Kingdom, 
it was later amended to cover all foreign heads of state whether in the UK or 
not and whether on official business or not. 
In the United States the issue of civil suit against foreign heads of state has 
generated a considerable body of judicial decisions, which in turn has 
provoked a lively scholarly debate. Since the rule has not been codified in the 
1976 FSIA the pre-FSIA practice of conclusive executive suggestion of 
immunity subsists. The State Department proceeds from the principle that all 
persons it recognized as the legitimate head of a foreign state enjoy absolute 
immunity from the civil jurisdiction of US courts. In 1965 the head of state of 
Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Bin Abdull Aziz Al-Saud was named as defendant 
in a civil suit before US courts. The state department had recognized his 
immunity as head of state and hence suspended proceedings. Hence there is 
no difference between the SIA and the FSIA since they both grant immunity 
to the head of state.49 
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The guidance provided by treaty law on the issue is limited and generally 
unhelpful. Article 21.1 of the 1969 Special Missions Convention provides 
that a head of state who leads a special mission enjoys the facilities, 
privileges and immunities accorded by international law to heads of state on 
an official visit. Article 3.2 of the 2004 Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property reflects the final Draft of the 
International Law Commission and provides that ‘[t]he present convention is 
without prejudice to privileges and immunities accorded under international 
law to leads of state ratione personae.’ The conclusion that head of states 
immunity ratione personae -which is head of state immunity- is not affected 
by the rules on state immunity ratione materiae leaves us empty-handed. 
The Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of 
State and of Government in international law adopted by the Institute de 
Droit International in 2001, adopts a restrictive approach. Article 3 provides 
that ‘[i]n civil and administrative matters, the Head of State does not enjoy 
any immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign state, unless 
that suit relates to acts performed in the exercise of his or her official 
functions. Nonetheless, nothing shall be done by way of court proceedings 
with regard to the head of State while he or she is in the territory of that state, 
in the exercise of official functions’. 
 (ii) Family Members: A Belgian court considered in a 1988 case 
concerning a civil claim instituted against the Zairian president Mobutu, his 
wife and his children that in contrast to the head of state itself, his family 
members could not rely on a rule of immunity from jurisdiction. The Swiss 
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Federal Tribunal considered in the 1989 case of Marcos and Marcos v 
Federal Department of Police50that:  
Customary international law has always granted to heads of state, as 
well as to the members of their family and their household visiting a 
foreign state, the privileges of personal inviolability and immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction. This jurisdictional immunity is also granted to a 
Head of State in a private capacity and also extends, in such 
circumstances, to the closest accompanying family members as well as 
to the senior members of his household staff. Accordingly, such 
persons cannot be the subject of criminal proceeding or even of a 
summons to appear before a court. 
The UK State Immunity Act 1978 provides a very extensive immunity to 
family members forming part of the household of a foreign head of state, as 
well as to private servants. Under section 20.1.b and c these individuals have 
a right to the same immunity as family members and servants of diplomatic 
agents on the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations. In contrast, the 
Australian Foreign States Immunities Act limits the application of the law of 
diplomatic immunity to the spouse of the head of state. 
 The US approach is consistent in that it relies on executive rather than 
judicial decision-making as mentioned earlier in comparison to the UK 
approach which uses both precedents and legislation.  
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(iii) Is Immunity Granted to Heads of Government and Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs? 
Article 15 of the Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution 
of Heads of Staff and of Government in International Law of the Institute de 
Droit International (2001) provides that: 
1. The Head of Government of a foreign state enjoys the same 
inviolability, and immunity from jurisdiction recognized, in this 
resolution, to the head of state. 
2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to such immunities to which 
other members of the government may be entitled on account of 
their official function. 
The immunity applicable to ministers of foreign affairs was the principle in 
question  in the Congo v Belgium 51litigation before the International Court of 
Justice at the time the Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and 
Execution of Heads of Staff and of Government in International Law of the 
Institute de Droit International (2001) was adopted. 
The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomats, distinguishes the 
position of heads of state from that of heads of government and ministers of 
foreign affairs. Article 1 provides that for the purposes of the convention 
‘internationally protected person’ means: 
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? Head of state, including any member of a collegial body 
performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution 
of state concerned, a Head of Government or a minister for 
foreign affairs, wherever any such person is in a foreign state, as 
well as members of his family who accompany him; 
? Any representative or official of a state or any official or other 
agent of an international organization of an intergovernmental 
character who, at the time when and in the place where a crime 
against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or 
his means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to 
international law to special protection from any attack on his 
person, freedom or dignity, as well as members of his family 
forming part of his household. 
Also article 21 of the 1969 Convention on Special Missions intimates a 
difference between the position of heads of state on the one hand and that of 
heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs on the other. The article 
reads as follows: 
1. The Head of the sending state, when he leads a special mission, 
shall enjoy in the receiving state or in a third state the facilities, 
privileges and immunities accorded by international law to heads 
of state on an official visit. 
2. The head of the government, the Minister for foreign affairs and 
other persons of high rank, when they take part in a special 
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mission of the sending state, shall enjoy in the receiving state or 
in a third state, in addition to what is granted by the present 
Convention, the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by 
international law. 
In Oppenheims’s International Law we read that the head of government 
‘does not represent the international persona of the state in the same way in 
which the Head of State does.’52 Watts53 elaborated on this theme stating that 
‘heads of government and foreign ministers… do not symbolize or personify 
their states in the way that heads of states do. Accordingly, they do not enjoy 
in international law any entitlement to special treatment by virtue of qualities 
of sovereignty or majesty attaching to them personally.’ The argument 
against equating the immunity of heads of government and ministers for 
foreign affairs with the immunity of heads state is therefore a strong one. 
7. Command Responsibility of the Head of State 
(i) The Roots of Command Responsibility 
One of the earliest recorded legal instruments was in a 1439 Ordinance, 
issued by Charles VII of France, denoting the criminal responsibility of his 
military commanders for failing to prevent or punish offences committed by 
troops under their command. The same concept is also encountered in the 
‘Articles of Military Lawwers to be observed in the Warres’ promulgated by 
King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1621. Similarly, although unsure as to 
                                                            
52 R Jennings and A Watts (eds) (1992) I 1033 cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek. Id.  at 194 
53 A Watts (1994) 102 cited in Rosanne Van Alebeek. Id.  at 194 
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whether a prince could be held criminally responsible, Grotius maintained 
that princess carried some responsibility for failing to prevent or punish the 
unlawful acts of their subjects. Moreover, although in the time of Henry V of 
England the prevailing legal attitude militated against holding kings to 
account for the acts of their troops (response non sovereign), Shakespeare 
argued that leaders should be held accountable because they are in command 
of their troops and have the authority to declare war.54 
It was not until1907 Hague Peace Conference that the concept of responsible 
command was incorporated, without any express reference to criminal 
liability, in an international legal instrument. The Regulations annexed to 
Hague Convention IV provided in Article 1 that in order for a party to a 
conflict to be afforded lawful belligerent status, it had to be ‘commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates’. Moreover, Article 43 of these 
Regulations required that military superiors who were in command of 
occupied territory: 
“Take all measures in [their] power to restore and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 
Similarly, Article 19 of the 1907 Hague Convention X provided that naval 
commanders have a task of overseeing the ‘execution of … the general 
principles of the Convention’. The Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties, established in the 
                                                            
54 Ilias Bantekas. Principles of Direct and Superior Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law. at 69-
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aftermath of World War I, concluded that proposed tribunal be given 
jurisdiction over persons: “Who ordered, or with knowledge thereof and with 
power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent 
putting an end to or repressing violations of the laws or customs of war.” 
? The International Military Tribunal Nuremberg did not concern itself with the 
doctrine of command responsibility since the accused were charged with 
having planned and ordered the relevant offences, but the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East found the doctrine appropriate for its 
proceedings, as did many post-World War II military tribunals. Despite their 
rich jurisprudence, no express provision on superior responsibility was 
contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This resulted in the decline in the 
use of the doctrine for a period of over thirty years, which was due in a large 
part to cold war rivalries, but was also associated with the difficulties in 
identifying hierarchical structures in the context of civil wars. Additionally, 
no consensus on an appropriate international mens rea could be reached. 
Significant progress was made with the inclusion of Articles 86 and 87 of the 
1977 Protocol Additional the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I ), but it was not until the Yugoslav and Rwandan civil conflicts 
that the doctrine was applied to modern warfare, which in turn paved the way 
for its incorporation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
  (ii) Liability of Superiors  
Liability incurred as a result of illegal acts committed by others is expressly 
defined in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Article 7(3) of the former, followed 
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verbatim in the Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, provides for the criminal 
responsibility of the superior: 
If he knows or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof. 
Superiors do not incur liability for the crimes of their subordinates simply 
because they happen to occupy that position. Rather, the doctrine of superior 
responsibility is premised on the following elements: (1) the existence of a 
superior-subordinate relationship; (2) that the superior knew or had reason to 
know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (3) 
that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrators thereof. 
During the preparatory conferences that led to the adoption of the 1977 
Protocol I, where reference to ‘commanders’ in Article 87 encompassed 
persons in command ‘at the highest level to leaders with only few men under 
their command’. This consistent irrelevance of rank in attributing superior 
responsibility indicates that the international lawmaking institutions look at 
actual and effective control, rather than formality. This is also the case with 
Article 28 of the ICC Statute, and represents long-standing practice in 
international law. Article 87 of Protocol I extends the legal obligations of 
commanders beyond troops under their command to encompass in addition 
‘other persons under their control’. Their obligation is applicable to superior 
at all levels of command. If the case were different, superiors with ample 
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means to intervene in crimes committed by troops under their control, but not 
under their command, would be fully justified in being passive. Accordingly, 
the concept of ‘command’ is not the only operative term for ascribing 
command liability, as the text of Article 87 extends the obligations of 
commanders to troops under their control. The concept of ‘superiority’ is 
therefore a broad one and should be viewed in terms of a hierarchy 
encompassing the concept of control. 
Superiors are criminally liable for the crimes of their subordinates only if 
they possessed the material ability to prevent and punish such crimes. This 
material ability may be either de jure or de facto in nature.  
Another category of individuals whose activity may be attributed to a state is 
that of de facto state organs. These are individuals who, although they do not 
have the formal status and rank of state officials, in fact act on behalf of state. 
They can be so regarded when they (i) act under instruction from a state or 
(ii) act under the overall control of a state, or (iii) in fact behave as state 
officials. A recent case may be recalled of Gaddafi55. On 20 October 2000 the 
Paris Court of Appeals ruled that it was permissible to prosecute in France 
the Libyan leader Muamar Qaddafi for complicity in murder of French 
nationals in relation to a terrorist act that is the bombing of a French airline 
over Niger in 1989. When it was objected that under the Libyan constitution 
Qaddafi was not head of state or Government, the French Foreign Ministry 
issued a press release stating among other things that the whole of the 
international community considers Qaddafi as the head of the Libyan state, 
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and drawing attention to the fact that when international summits are 
convened it is Qaddafi who represent Libya. The press release declared that: 
We consider as a matter of the head of state of Libya … its Colonel 
Qaddafi who is invited; nobody has ever thought that there might be 
anybody other than him to be regarded as head of state. 
The rule is to some extent codified in article 5 of the ILC Draft (2000), which 
concerns public entities that are not state organs under national law. Under 
this article ‘the conduct of an entity which is not an organ of the state … but 
is empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under 
international law, provided the entity was acting in that capacity in the case in 
question.’ 56 
8. International Human Rights versus Immunity 
The world is undergoing series of changes in the scope of international 
human rights law as well as the development of international criminal law; 
hence immunity rules granted by international law to states and in turn heads 
of state and their officials are directly affected by their presence.  
Judge Rosalyn Higgins has counseled: “It is very easy to elevate sovereign 
immunity into a superior principle of international law and to lose sight of the 
essential reality that it is an exception to the normal doctrine of jurisdiction.” 
However, by understanding that “[I]t is sovereign immunity which is the 
exception to jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic 
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rule of immunity,” the possibilities for meaningful and effective human rights 
litigation emerge. With jurisdiction as the rule and immunity as the 
exception, it is incumbent upon the foreign state defendant, not the individual 
plaintiff, to point to the rule, domestic or international, that requires 
immunity.57 
1. Theories that Lift State Immunity for Human Rights Violations 
We will discuss two theories the first theory is the Normative Hierarchy 
Theory and the second theory is the Theory of Collective Benefits developed 
by Caplan. 
 (i)The Normative Hierarchy Theory  
The theory operates conceptually on the international law level, as one norm 
of international law, jus cogens, trumps another, state immunity, because of 
its superior status. The theory thus assumes that state immunity in cases of 
human rights violations is an entitlement rooted in international law, by 
virtue of either a fundamental state right or customary international law.58  
(a) The Americans approach: The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.59. In that case, the 
plaintiffs sued in tort to reclaim losses arising out of the unprovoked bombing 
of an oil tanker on the high seas by the government of Argentina, allegedly a 
violation of international law. The Court ruled that the FSIA was “the sole 
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basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state” in U.S. courts. Moreover, 
the Court held that American courts may hear suits against foreign states only 
where Congress has explicitly provided a statutory exception to the FSIA’s 
general rule of immunity. A suit involving an armed attack against a ship on 
the high seas was not one over which Congress had intended the courts to 
exercise jurisdiction, the Court found, and thus it rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim. 
The Court’s restrictive interpretation of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity 
prompted a group of three law students to publish an inventive Comment in 
1991 entitled Implied Waiver under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to 
Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law60. The 
authors propose that states lose all entitlement to state immunity under 
international law when they injure individuals in violation of jus cogens 
norms. Their theory starts from the premise that, following the Nuremberg 
trials, the structure of international law changed; in particular, the “rise of jus 
cogens” placed substantial limitations on state conduct in the name of 
peaceful international relations. Indeed, “[b]ecause jus cogens norms are 
hierarchically superior to the positivist or voluntary laws of consent; they 
absolutely restrict the freedom of the state in the exercise of its sovereign 
powers.”61 
Jus cogens norm “is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of state as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
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permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.” 62 
Hence, their theory concludes that regardless that the scope of the term jus 
cogens has not been completely defined-so far certain norms such as 
prohibition against piracy, slavery, genocide, aggression and torture are 
within the scope- and since sovereign immunity is not regarded as a jus 
cogen’s norm, it is deduced that the jus cogen’s norm is superior to sovereign 
immunity. Therefore in case these two norms conflict then jus cogens will 
prevail so as to protect human rights. This prevalence is impliedly given by 
the foreign state offender and requires no consent as to the waiver of 
immunity for being tried in court. Thus immunity is not regarded as a 
defense. 
Professor Cassese in support of this theory stated that, “peremptory norms [or 
jus cogens] may impact on State immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign 
States, in that they may remove such immunity.”63 
(b) The European Approach: to this matter was mainly a jurisprudential 
development that came naturally as we mentioned previously that civil law 
countries did not enact state immunity legislations. Instead they relied on 
their constitutions  which required them to take guidance from international 
law when it comes to sovereign immunity. In this matter according to 
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Bianchi64, ensuring that the application of international law produces just 
results requires judges to undertake a “value-oriented” interpretation of 
international law norms, giving preference to peremptory norms, such as the 
protection of human rights, over norms of lesser importance, such as state 
immunity. This opinion was put to action in the case of Prefecture of Voiotia 
v. Federal Republic of Germany65. 
(ii)The Theory of Collective Benefits: The raison d’être behind state 
immunity under customary international law which is to allow foreign states 
to function within the forum state without any fear of seizure or jurisdictional 
free from arrest, or adverse legal proceedings for purposes of executing their 
public functions effectively. Applying these factors to the world today, 
especially with the introduction of the concepts of globalization and the 
restrictive sovereignty that was injected by the UN Charter 1945 – which 
stipulates several principles restraining state behaviour, including the 
obligation to uphold the principles of sovereign independence, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and the protection of human rights- the foreign state 
can no longer act recklessly and must respect rules stipulated under 
international customary law that granted it immunity and the rules of conduct 
under international agreements. Thus, in case of any human rights violation 
immunity will be denied. This approach was discussed in the Arrest Warrant 
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Case (Congo v. Belgium2002) Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000(Democratic 
Republic of Congo V Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002.66   
Prefecture of Voiotia-mentioned above- conforms with the theory of 
collective state benefit for many of the same reasons as the 1996 FSIA 
amendment which introduced an additional exception to the immunity of 
certain foreign states for a limited range of human rights violations. The 
infliction of wanton terror on Greek civilians by the Nazis during World War 
II was a direct affront to the vital interest of Greece, the forum state. 
Regardless of the label it bears, sovereign, military, jure imperii, or 
otherwise, a foreign state’s unlawful killing of the forum state’s civilians 
destroys bilateral relations between forum and foreign state and may even 
jeopardize the security and stability of the community of states. Thus, putting 
aside its endorsement of the normative hierarchy theory, Prefecture of 
Voiotia represents a legitimate solution to the human rights litigation 
problem.67 
Taken together, the 1996 FSIA amendment and Prefecture of Voiotia 
demonstrate that progress can be made in resolving the human rights 
litigation problem in a manner consistent with the true nature of the doctrine 
of foreign state immunity. That is to say that the forum state, through the 
agent it designates to create and interpret foreign state immunity law (the 
U.S. Congress in the case of the 1996 amendment and the Hellenic Supreme 
Court in the case of Prefecture of Voiotia), is empowered to modify foreign 
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state immunity law to an extent consistent with the theory of collective state 
benefit. These developments further show that such modifications are 
possible in two very different legal settings: the 1996 amendment arose in a 
common law country with national immunity legislation, while Prefecture 
Voiotia resulted from the jurisprudential application of international law in a 
civil law country without national immunity legislation.68 
9. Universal Jurisdiction versus Immunity  
Universal jurisdiction is carte blanche which allows national courts to 
prosecute any person even with immunity for crimes that violate international 
human rights law. International legal practice over the centuries has rendered 
several offenses susceptible to universal jurisdiction. Historically, acts of 
piracy on the high seas and slave trading were branded international crimes, 
with their perpetrators made subject to universal jurisdiction by any 
government who could apprehend the offenders.69  In the Nuremberg Trials 
following the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal defined 
"[a]n international crime as ... an act universally recognized as criminal, 
which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some 
valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that 
would have control over it under ordinary circumstances."70 Hence, 
jurisdiction over these crimes must be international as well. International 
                                                            
68 Id. at 780 
69Christopher C. Joyner. Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability. 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. (Autumn 1996) 153 at165 167,163,164,165 and 168 
70 Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg 1945  
  42
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, torture, crimes 
against the peace and war crimes those acts have been expressly prohibited 
by international law. Immunity from adjudication is no longer a resort for 
impunity.  
Jurisdiction is defined as "the authority of states to prescribe their law, to 
subject persons and things to adjudication in their courts and other tribunals, 
and to enforce their law, both judicially and non-judicially." 71 
Traditionally, a state may not prosecute a criminal seized beyond its borders 
unless it has lawful jurisdiction over the committed act. The jurisdiction to 
prescribe must exist before the jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, therefore, involves a two-step process. First, it 
must be determined whether a domestic law exists that covers the offensive 
act. Second, it must be ascertained whether a sovereign state may, under 
international law, prescribe such conduct extraterritorially. The universality 
principle, which holds that some crimes are so universally abhorrent and thus 
condemned that their perpetrators are hostis humani generis enemies of all 
people and allows that jurisdiction, may be based solely on securing custody 
of the perpetrator. 
Universal jurisdiction assigns a state the authority to prosecute a criminal 
under its own law, rather than that of the state where the crime was 
committed. This principle is grounded in the assumption that the prosecuting 
state is acting on behalf of all states. In the case of war criminals, unless the 
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perpetrator or his victims are citizens or residents of the state wanting to 
prosecute, any assertion of authority to prosecute an alleged offender must be 
based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. Since atrocities committed as 
war crimes are committed only in some states, but outside the territory of 
most others, against persons who were residents and citizens of the former 
other states, none of the other jurisdictional principles apply. The only basis 
for prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity by 
other governments is the discovered presence of the criminals in some state 
and the moral obligation of that government to bring them to justice on behalf 
of the international community. Universal jurisdiction furnishes the legal 
basis for exercising that moral obligation.  
The international legal norms of erga omnes and jus cogens lend support to 
the role that universal jurisdiction can play in obtaining jurisdiction over war 
crimes offenders. Obligations erga omnes are literally obligations that "apply 
to all." Obligations owed by a state to the international community as a whole 
are the concern of all states. All states have a legal interest in their protection, 
and these are therefore obligations erga omnes. 
Examples of some practices of the principle of universal jurisdiction can be 
reflected in the following treaties such as the US in the treaties on terrorism 
and aircraft hijacking dating from 1970 as well as serious crimes committed 
abroad. Universal jurisdiction was also the concept that allowed Israel to try 
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961. 
 Also in international conventions such as the Torture Convention of 1984, 
ratified by 124 governments requires states either to prosecute any suspected 
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torturer found on their territory, regardless of where the torture took place, or 
to extradite the suspect to a country that will do so. Similarly, the Geneva 
Conventions of 194972 on the conduct of war, ratified by 189 countries 
require each participating state to "search for" persons who have committed 
grave breaches of the conventions and to "bring such persons, regardless of 
nationality, before its own courts."73 
10. Conclusion  
Commercial transactions between states have led to the modification of the 
absolute immunity doctrine to become restrictive. The recent movement in 
the development of the international human rights law in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, followed by the establishment of the United Nations 
compelled the world to take a pause and address the issue of prosecuting the 
individuals responsible for these massacres. This led to a development of new 
genera of international criminal law that advocates the prosecution of 
individuals in contrast with state responsibility. Yet the differentiation 
between the current head of state and former head of state is apparent in the 
case law presented in this chapter. Although proponents of human rights 
advocate that head of state immunity is lifted automatically when a violation 
in terms of international crimes takes place we find that the case law 
                                                            
72 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Conflict in the Field. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 49, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 50, Convention (III) 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 129. Convention (IV) relative 
Protection of Civilian Persons in War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at article 146. 
 
73 Kenneth Roth. The Case for Universal Jurisdiction. www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2001/80/5   Volume 80, 
Number 5( September/October, 2001) at 1-2 
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disagrees in cases of current head of state but in cases of former head of state 
there is an agreement that immunity is lifted since he no longer fulfills the 
position of head of state 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ADJUDICATION 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will highlight some of the leading cases that shaped the 
jurisprudence of head of state immunity. These cases will discuss immunity 
in the cases of former and current head of states and their officials in 
application of the principles discussed in Chapter One. 
2. Suleiman Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait and Others Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division) (1996)1 
The facts of this case may be summarized as follows. 
The applicant, who had joint British and Kuwaiti citizenship, was a trained 
pilot. He went to Kuwait in 1991 to assist in its defence against Iraq. During 
the Gulf War he served as a member of the Kuwaiti Air Force and, after the 
Iraqi invasion, he remained behind as a member of the resistance movement. 
During that period he came into possession of sexual video tapes involving 
Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah Al-Saud Al-Sabah ("the Sheikh"), who is related to 
the Emir of Kuwait and is said to have an influential position in Kuwait. By 
some means these tapes entered general circulation, for which the applicant 
was held responsible by the Sheikh.  
                                                            
1 www.westlaw.com (2009) at 1,4-7 
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 After the Iraqi armed forces were expelled from Kuwait, on or about 2nd May 
1991, the Sheikh and two others gained entry to the applicant's house, beat 
him and took him at gun-point in a government jeep to the Kuwaiti State 
Security Prison. The applicant was falsely imprisoned there for several days 
during which he was repeatedly beaten by security guards. He was released 
on 5th May 1991, having been forced to sign a false confession.  
 On or about 7thMay 1991 the Sheikh took the applicant at gunpoint in a 
government car to the palace of the Emir of Kuwait's brother. At first the 
applicant's head was repeatedly held underwater in a swimming pool 
containing corpses, and he was then dragged into a small room where the 
Sheikh set fire to mattresses soaked in petrol, as a result of which the 
applicant was seriously burnt.  
 Initially the applicant was treated in a Kuwaiti hospital, and on 17th May 
1991 he returned to England where he spent six weeks in hospital being 
treated for burns covering 25 per cent of his total body surface area. He also 
suffered psychological damage and has been diagnosed as suffering from a 
severe form of post-traumatic stress disorder, aggravated by the fact that, 
once in England, he received threats warning him not to take action or give 
publicity to his plight.   
 On 29th August 1992 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in England for 
compensation against the Sheikh and the Government of Kuwait in respect of 
injury to his physical and mental health caused by torture in Kuwait in May 
1991 and threats against his life and well-being made after his return to the 
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United Kingdom on 17th May 1991. On 15th December 1992 he obtained a 
default judgment against the Sheikh.  
 The proceedings were re-issued after an amendment to include two named 
individuals as defendants. On 8th July 1993 a deputy High Court judge ex 
parte gave the applicant leave to serve the proceedings on the individual 
defendants. This decision was confirmed in chambers on 2nd August 1993. He 
was not, however, granted leave to serve the writ on the Kuwaiti 
Government.  
The applicant submitted a renewed application to the Court of Appeal, which 
was heard ex parte on 21st January 1994. Judgment was delivered the same 
day. The court held, on the basis of the applicant's allegations, that there were 
three elements pointing towards governmental responsibility for the events in 
Kuwait: first, the applicant had been taken to a State prison; secondly, 
Government transport had been used on 2nd and 7th May 1991; and, thirdly, in 
the prison he had been mistreated by public officials. It found that the 
applicant had established a good arguable case, based on principles of 
international law, that Kuwait should not be afforded immunity under section 
1(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 ("the 1978 Act") in respect of acts of 
torture. In addition, there was medical evidence indicating that the applicant 
had suffered damage (post-traumatic stress) while in the United Kingdom. It 
followed that the conditions in order 11 rule 1(f) of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court had been satisfied and that leave should be granted to serve the writ on 
the Kuwait Government.  
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The latter, after receiving the writ, sought an order striking out the 
proceedings. The application was examined; inter partes, by the High Court 
on 15th March 1995. In a judgment delivered the same day the court held that 
it was for the applicant to show on the balance of probabilities that the 
Government of Kuwait were not entitled to immunity under the 1978 Act. It 
was prepared provisionally to accept that the Government was vicariously 
responsible for conduct that would qualify as torture under international law. 
However, international law could be used only to assist in interpreting 
lacunae or ambiguities in a statute, and when the terms of a statute were 
clear, the statute had to prevail over international law. The clear language of 
the 1978 Act bestowed immunity upon sovereign States for acts committed 
out-side the jurisdiction and, by making express provision for exceptions, it 
excluded as a matter of construction implied exceptions. As a result, there 
was no room for an implied exception for acts of torture in section 1(1) of the 
1978 Act. Moreover, the court was not satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities that the Kuwaiti Government were responsible for the threats 
made to the applicant after 17th May 1991. As a result, the exception provided 
for by section 5 of the 1978 Act could not apply. It followed that the action 
against the Government should be struck out.  
The applicant appealed and the Court of Appeal examined the case on 12th  
March 1996. The Court held that the applicant had not established on the 
balance of probabilities that the Kuwaiti Government was responsible for the 
threats made in the United Kingdom. The important question was, therefore, 
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whether State immunity applied in respect of the alleged events in Kuwait. 
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith finding against the applicant, observed:  
“Jurisdiction of the English court in respect of foreign States is 
governed by the State Immunity Act 1978. Section 1(1) provides:  
'A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of 
this Act. ...'  
... The only relevant exception is section 5, which provides:  
'A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of--  
(a) death of personal injury ... caused by an act or omission in the 
United Kingdom.'  
It is plain that the events in Kuwait do not fall within the exception in 
section 5, and the express words of section 1 provide immunity to the 
First Defendant. Despite this, in what [counsel] for the Plaintiff 
acknowledges is a bold submission, he contends that that section must 
be read subject to the implication that the State is only granted 
immunity if it is acting within the Law of Nations. So that the section 
reads: 'A State acting within the Law of Nations is immune from 
jurisdiction except as provided ...' ... The argument is ... that 
international law against torture is so fundamental that it is a jus cogens  
or compelling law, which overrides all other principles of international 
law, including the well-established principles of sovereign immunity. 
No authority is cited for this proposition. ... At common law, a 
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sovereign State could not be sued at all against its will in the courts of 
this country. The 1978 Sovereign Immunity Act, by the exceptions 
therein set out, marks substantial inroads into this principle. It is 
inconceivable; it seems to me, that the draughtsman, who must have 
been well aware of the various international agreements about torture, 
intended section 1 to be subject to an overriding qualification.  
... A moment's reflection is enough to show that the practical 
consequences of the Plaintiff's submission would be dire. The courts in 
the United Kingdom are open to all who seek their help, whether they 
are British citizens or not. A vast number of people come to this 
country each year seeking refuge and asylum, and many of these allege 
that they have been tortured in the country whence they came. Some of 
these claims are no doubt justified, others are more doubtful. Those 
who are presently charged with the responsibility for deciding whether 
applicants are genuine refugees have a difficult enough task, but at least 
they know much of the background and surrounding circumstances 
against which the claim is made. The court would be in no such 
position. The foreign States would be unlikely to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom court, and in its absence the court 
would have no means of testing the claim or making a just 
determination.” 
The other two members of the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Ward and Mr. 
Justice Buckley, also rejected the applicant's claim. Lord Justice Ward 
commented that "there may be no international forum (other than the forum 
  52
of the locus delicti to whom a victim of torture will be understandably 
reluctant to turn) where this terrible, if established, wrong can receive civil 
redress".  
 On 27th November 1996 the applicant was refused leave to appeal by the 
House of Lords. His attempts to obtain compensation from the Kuwaiti 
authorities via diplomatic channels have proved unsuccessful. 
3. Pinochet Case: Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis and Others (Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) 
Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis and Others (Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) 
on 25 November 19982 
The facts of this case may be summarized as follows. 
Senator Pinochet was the Head of State of Chile from 11 September 1973 
until 11 March 1990. It is alleged that during that period there took place in 
Chile various crimes against humanity (torture, hostage taking and murder) 
for which he was knowingly responsible.  
In October 1998 Senator Pinochet was in this country- UK- receiving medical 
treatment. In October and November 1998 the judicial authorities in Spain 
issued international warrants for his arrest to enable his extradition to Spain 
to face trial for those alleged offences. The Spanish Supreme Court has held 
                                                            
2 http://www.publications.parliament.uk 
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that the courts of Spain have jurisdiction to try him. Pursuant to those 
international warrants, on 16 and 23 October 1998 Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrates issued two provisional warrants for his arrest under section 
8(1)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989. Senator Pinochet was arrested.  
Pinochet immediately applied to the Queen's Bench Divisional Court to 
quash the warrants. The warrant of 16 October was quashed and nothing 
further turns on that warrant. The second warrant of 23 October 1998 was 
quashed by an order of the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division 
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill C.J., Collins and Richards JJ.). The reasoning C.J. 
made was that General Pinochet had functional immunity when these acts 
were committed as head of state of Chile. The legal basis was article 20 of 
the SIA that grants heads of state similar privileges and immunity to the head 
of the diplomatic mission according to VCDR 1961. This judgment was 
inspired by the Al Adsani v The Government of Kuwait (1996) that granted 
state immunity to the state for acts of torture hence a head of state in similar 
circumstances is entitled to immunity too.3 
However, the quashing of the second warrant was stayed to enable an appeal 
to be taken to The House of Lords on the question certified by the Divisional 
Court as to "the proper interpretation and scope of the immunity enjoyed by a 
former Head of State from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United 
Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was Head of State."  
                                                            
3 Andrea Bianchi. Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case.10 EJIL 237  at 239 (1999) 
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The House of Lords in November 25th 1998 reversed the decision of the 
lower court in a decision of two to three and held that a former head of state 
is not entitled to immunity for acts of torture, hostage taking, crimes against 
humanity and murder committed while he was in office. Lord Nicholls in his 
own opinion that was concurring by Lord Hoffman held that international law 
in light of which domestic law has to be interpreted ‘has made it plain that 
certain types of conduct… are not acceptable on the part of anyone’ and that 
‘the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law’. In his 
view Pinochet was not entitled to immunity under article 20 of SIA since the 
immunity is granted to the functions heads of state which are recognized by 
international law irrespective of the domestic law. Nor does he enjoy the 
residual immunity granted by customary international law. In addition, 
conventions on Torture and Hostage Taking have permitted the 
extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction in municipal courts. On 
similar lines Lord Steyn delivered a similar reasoning that torture, genocide, 
crimes against humanity and hostage-taking which are condemned by 
international fall beyond the functions of the head of state hence waiving his 
immunity.4 
4. Congo V. Belgium (The Arrest Warrant Case) ICJ 20025 
 The facts of this case may be summarized as follows. 
                                                            
4  Id at 240-1 
5 http://www.icj-cij.org 
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In April 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate issued “an international 
arrest warrant in absentia” against the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Congo Mr. Abdoulaye Yeordai Ndombasi, alleging grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto and 
crimes against humanity under the principle of universal jurisdiction. The 
arrest warrant was internationally circulated through Interpol.  
The Congo brought a suit against Belgium in the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) asking it to declare that Belgium, by issuing the international 
arrest warrant, violated the legal obligation Belgium owes to the Congo and 
that Belgium must therefore cancel the arrest warrant.   
By the time the case was argued before the ICJ, Mr. Yerodai, the person in 
question was no longer the Foreign Minister of the Congo. On this ground 
Belgium tried to unsuccessfully argue before the ICJ that the case was 'moot'. 
The Congo based its sole argument on the ground that since the arrest warrant 
was directed at the time of issue against an incumbent Foreign Minister who 
is immune from the judicial process of other courts, Belgian was in breach of 
international law.  
 The court referred to conventions such as VCDR 1961 and The New York 
Convention on Special Missions 1969 provide useful guidance on certain 
aspects of the question of immunities. They do not, however, contain any 
provision specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs. Hence, the court decided to rely on customary international 
law to address the question of immunity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign 
Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she 
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when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual 
concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder 
him or her in the performance of his or her duties. 
 None of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military 
tribunals, or of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
cited by Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused 
of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court 
accordingly noted that those decisions are in no way at variance with the 
findings it has reached. 
The Court emphasized, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by 
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy 
impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of 
their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal 
responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is 
procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. 
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for 
certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all 
criminal responsibility. 
The court continued to elaborate on the issue of immunity and impunity by 
stating that: “the immunities enjoyed under international law by an 
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to 
criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. First, such persons enjoy no 
criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may 
  57
thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with the relevant rules 
of domestic law. Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign 
jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented decides to 
waive that immunity. Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the 
immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has 
jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed 
prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts 
committed during that period of office in a private capacity. Fourthly, an 
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal 
proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have 
jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal Court created 
by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter’s Statute expressly provides, in 
Article 27, paragraph 2, that “[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which 
may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over 
such a person”. 
State officials who commit international crimes do so in their ‘private 
capacity’ and not their ‘official capacity’ hence overruling the state’s 
responsibility for his actions and concurring individual responsibility on this 
official. 
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The Court, by a solid majority, accepted the Congo's contention. It held that 
even in cases of persons accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs have, under the principles of 
customary international law, absolute immunity from another nation's judicial 
processes.  
There were dissenting opinions to what might be considered this 
'traditionalist' ruling of the ICJ. Judge Al-Khasawneh (from Jordan) dissented 
stating that “'the need for effective combating of grave crimes ... represents a 
higher norm than the rules of immunity' especially in cases of Foreign 
Ministers whose immunity under international law are not as clear or 
categorical as 'the immunities of diplomats and Heads of States'.  
Due to a technicality, the tenability or otherwise of the claim of universal 
jurisdiction by domestic courts was not directly ruled upon by the ICJ in this 
case. In a separate opinion and as an observation, the President of the ICJ, 
Judge Guillaume expressed his view that 'under the law as classically 
formulated ... only the crimes of piracy' and a few others in which 'the 
offender is present on [the] territory [of the state claiming universal 
jurisdiction] does international law accept universal jurisdiction'. However in 
the joint separate opinions of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Judge Koijmans and 
Buergenthal argued that though they agreed with the majority ruling, 'the 
growing international consensus on the need to punish crimes regarded as 
most heinous by the international community, indicate that the warrant for 
the arrest of Mr. Yerodia did not as such violate international law'.6 
                                                            
6Myint Zan. Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000; Crimes against Humanity: 
Immunity' versus 'Impunity'. 7  South Pacific L. J. ( 2003) 
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On 14th February 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced its 
ruling by a vote of thirteen votes to three that the arrest warrant of 11th April 
2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, and its international 
circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of 
Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to 
respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which 
the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo enjoyed under international law Foreign Ministers cannot be indicted 
by the courts of another nation and any arrest warrant issued by the courts or 
executive officials of one country against a Foreign Minister of another 
country is, in effect, a violation of international law. And this would be so 
even if the Foreign Minister in question had been formally indicted on 
grounds of 'universal jurisdiction 'for crimes against humanity. By ten votes 
to six, the ICJ also ruled that Belgium must 'by means of its own choosing' 
cancel the arrest warrant.  
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5. Jones (Respondent) v. Ministry of Interior Al -Mamlaka Al –Arabiya 
ASSaudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Appellants) 
-Mitchell and others (Respondents) v. Al-Dali and others and Ministry of 
Interior Al -Mamlaka Al -Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) (Appellants) 
-Jones (Appellant) v. Ministry of Interior Al -Mamlaka Al -Arabiya AS 
Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Respondents) [2006] UKHL 267 
The facts of this case may be summarized as follows. 
On 6th June 2002 Mr. Jones, brought an action before the High Court against 
two defendants: the Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(“The Kingdom”), which (it is accepted) is for present purposes the Kingdom 
itself; and Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Aziz, sued as servant or agent of the 
Kingdom. He claimed aggravated and exemplary damages for assault and 
battery, trespass to the person, false imprisonment and torture in the Kingdom 
between March and May 2001. Permission was granted by Master Whitaker 
ex parte to serve the Kingdom out of the jurisdiction, and service was duly 
effected. Further permission was granted to serve Colonel Abdul Aziz, but he 
was not served. The Kingdom then applied to set aside service of the 
proceedings and to dismiss Mr. Jones’s claim on the ground of state 
immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978. On that ground, on 30 July 
                                                            
7 http://www.publications.parliament.uk 
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2003, Master Whitaker set aside service of the proceedings and refused 
permission to serve Colonel Abdul Aziz by an alternative method. With the 
master’s permission, Mr. Jones appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending 
that Part 1 of the 1978 Act was incompatible with article 6(1)(the right to 
access court hence a right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 Messrs Mitchell, Sampson and Walker are the claimants in the second action 
giving rise to this appeal. They issued High Court proceedings on 12 
February 2004 against four defendants. The first two defendants were sued as 
officers in the Kingdom’s police force. The third defendant was sued as a 
colonel in the Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom and deputy governor of a 
prison in which the claimants were confined. The fourth defendant was sued 
as head of the Ministry of Interior. They claimed aggravated damages for 
assault and negligence, contending that they had been subjected to torture by 
the first two defendants, which the third and fourth defendants had caused or 
permitted or negligently failed to prevent. On 18 February 2004 Master 
Whitaker refused the claimants’ ex parte application to serve the proceedings 
out of the jurisdiction on the ground of state immunity under the 1978 Act. 
With the master’s permission, the claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Jones’s appeal against the dismissal of all 
his claims against the Kingdom, including his claim based on torture (but not 
including his claim in false imprisonment, which he had abandoned). But it 
allowed Mr. Jones’s appeal against refusal of permission to serve Colonel 
Abdul Aziz out of the jurisdiction by an alternative method, and it allowed 
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the appeal of the three claimants in the second action against the refusal of 
permission to serve all four defendants out of the jurisdiction (save in respect 
of the claimants’ allegations of negligence). The applications for permission 
to serve out of the jurisdiction in both actions were remitted to Master 
Whitaker for him to consider whether, in the exercise of his discretion, to 
grant permission to serve out. Mr. Jones, the Kingdom and the claimants in 
the second action have all appealed against those parts of the Court of 
Appeal’s orders which were adverse to them, save that none of the claimants 
has challenged the dismissal of his claims not based on torture. 
The House of Lords in a unanimous decision reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in respect of the six defendants- state agents- deciding that 
they were entitled to immunity ratione materiae from the jurisdiction of the 
English courts. The leading judgments were delivered by Lord Bingham and 
Lord Hoffmann.  The court conceded that the SIA did not expressly provide 
for cases where a suit is brought against state agents, but concluded that they 
were nevertheless entitled to ‘foreign state protection under the same cloak as 
the state protects itself’. The acts of the individual defendants in both actions 
were in fact sovereign in nature, irrespective of their illegality under 
international law.8 
Lord Hoffmann criticised Mance LJ's conclusion that a discretionary 
approach to immunity was more appropriate than a ‘blanket’ denial of 
jurisdiction. Lord Hoffmann remarked that this represented a misconception 
                                                            
8 Pietro Di Ciaccio. Torturer’s Manifesto? Impunity through Immunity in Jones v The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 30 Sydney L. R. 551. at 559-560 (2008) 
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of the nature of state immunity, which was not imposed at the discretion of 
the domestic court, but imposed from the outside by international law. That 
is, the foreign state either has the right to claim immunity or not, and the 
decision is not down to the discretion of the domestic court. This perhaps 
misunderstands Mance LJ’s argument that the discretion exists in the 
domestic court because there is no right to immunity ratione materiae for 
torture. The court would exercise discretion pursuant to the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, not state immunity. 
Lord Bingham observed in Jones that: 
A state can only act through its servants and agents; their official acts 
are the acts of the state; and the state’s immunity in respect of them is 
fundamental to the principle of state immunity. It is no doubt true that 
the availability of immunity ratione materiae to state agents is crucial, 
for a state functions through them, yet only the highest ranking officials 
attract the protection of immunity ratione personae.9 
6. Discussion of the Cases 
The cases discussed above mark the evolution of international law in terms of 
head of state and their state officials’ immunity. Even though a bold step was 
commenced by the House of Lords in the Pinochet case by not granting the 
former head of state of Chile immunity for acts that violate international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law during his term in office 
and condemning those acts and striving to hold accountable any individual no 
                                                            
9  Id. at 560 
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matter what his position is. This was definitely rebirth of international 
criminal law. Yet, as we compare this courageous decision we find that the 
House of Lords itself in the case of Al Adsani which was prior to the 
Pinochet case, we find that immunity was granted to the Government of 
Kuwait and this principle was concurred in the Jones case that granted the 
incumbent head of state of Saudi Arabia and beyond them their the heads of 
government and state officials immunity for acts that violate international 
law. The situation became hazy when the ICJ made its decision in the Arrest 
Warrant case by broadening the scope and granting the incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Congo- who was no longer in his position when the 
Congo filed the case- immunity for acts that violate international 
humanitarian law during his term in office. Thus, a question could be raised 
as to reason behind these decisions. Firstly, it’s apparent that the latter cases 
are against incumbent heads of states or their officials. Secondly, the 
similarity lies in the grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
committed by these officials. Thirdly, the raison d’être behind immunity is to 
facilitate the functions of these officials especially when travelling abroad so 
that they can carry out their functions effectively. This leads us to fourthly, 
sovereignty and equality of states and their officials as to the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts to try such cases. This point contradicts the principle of 
universal jurisdiction- incorporated in domestic laws of countries such as 
Belgium- which calls for prosecution of serious crimes irrespective of the 
place where the act was committed or nationality of the person who 
committed the act.  
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I conclude by emphasizing the fact that before head of states and their 
officials ask for their rights to immunity they should respect and implement 
their duty to uphold human rights under the UN Charter by allowing 
domestic courts to try such officials who break the law and hence ensuring 
the sovereignty and equality of states officials. Immunity should not be an 
easy mean for impunity. My understanding is that the real reason behind the 
courts decisions in the latter cases is that those cases were against incumbent 
heads of state not former heads of state like in the Pinochet case and therefore 
the decisions were highly influenced by political relations among states rather 
than the technical aspects of the law. This was clearly reflected in the Arrest 
warrant case when a former Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of 
proceedings was granted immunity for acts in violation of the IHL -since the 
arrest warrant was issued in the period when he was still in office-, all this to 
preserve the sovereignty of the Congo regardless that Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi doesn’t enjoy functional immunity anymore .Therefore there are a 
lot of strings attached as to sovereignty and equality of states and also the 
stability of the state itself if its head of state is extradited for the purposes of 
trial. Thus, this glares a gap in international law today as to the position of 
states if their head of state is detained, what is the position of the state and 
how do we balance international law obligations on states in regards to trying 
international human rights and international humanitarian law violators and 
also sustaining the sovereignty and stability of the state. 
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7. Conclusion 
I conclude by stating that the quest to prosecute international law violators’ in 
particular incumbent head of states and their officials is unsettled yet. 
Precedents have settled the debate of former heads of states by denying them 
immunity. One should remember that the principle is the jurisdiction of 
courts to prosecute the exception however is immunity granted to head of 
states that prevents their prosecution. Hence, there should be a balance 
between upholding human rights and humanitarian law and the prosecution 
of offenders who have immunity.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the international criminal tribunals namely the 
International Military Tribunal “IMT” at Nuremburg and the Far East (also 
known as IMT at Tokyo), The International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia “ICTY”, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda “ICTR and 
the International Criminal Court “ICC”. 
2.  The Development of the Prosecution of International Crimes  
Prosecutions for war crimes used to be conducted by national courts, and 
these were and still remain ineffective when those responsible for the crimes 
are still in power and their victims remain subjugated. Historically, the 
prosecution of war crimes was generally restricted to the vanquished or to 
isolated cases of rogue combatants in the victor's army. National justice 
systems have often proven themselves to be incapable of being balanced and 
impartial in such cases. 1 
One of the founders of the Red Cross movement, which grew up in Geneva in 
the 1860s, urged a draft statute for an international criminal court. Its task 
would be to prosecute breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and other 
                                                            
1 William A. Schabas. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. at 1-3 (2nd  Edition 2004)  
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humanitarian norms. But Gustav Monnier's innovative proposal was much 
too radical for its time. 2 
The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 represent the first significant 
codification of the laws of war in an international treaty. They include 
important series of provisions dealing with the protection of civilian 
populations. Article 46 of the Regulations that is annexed to the Hague 
Convention IV of 1907 enshrines the respect of “[f]amily Honor and rights, 
the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice.”3 
The Hague conventions, as international treaties, were meant to impose 
obligations and duties upon states, and were not intended to create criminal 
liability for individuals. They declared certain acts to be illegal, but not 
criminal, as can be seen from the absence of anything suggesting a sanction 
for their violation. Within only a few years, The Hague Conventions were 
being presented as a source of the law of war crimes. 4 
Actual prosecution for violations of the Hague conventions would have to 
wait until Nuremberg. Offences against the laws and customs of war, known 
as 'Hague Law'  because of their roots in the 1899 and 1907 conventions, are 
codified in the 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
                                                            
2 Id. at 2 
3 Convention Concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 3 cited in Id. at 2 
4 Id. at 2 
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Former Yugoslavia and in article 8(2) (b), (e) and (f) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 5 
3. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg and the Far East 
(i) Introduction 
During the Second World War, millions of Jews and other selected civilians 
were systematically exterminated and otherwise subjected to abuse. After that 
War, the Allied victors established international war crimes tribunals in 
Nuremberg in Germany and Tokyo in Japan to hold trials of high level Nazis 
and Japanese accused of committing crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The indictment for the Nuremberg Tribunal gave 
no mention of gender crimes, whereas the indictment for the Tokyo Tribunal 
did mention rape in conjunction with other crimes, such as murder, torture, 
rape, and looting of a village. The Judgments, as would be expected in the 
context of the Holocaust, focused on crimes against peace and on mass 
atrocities committed against innocent civilians in concentration camps in 
Europe and in vanquished towns across Asia.  
(ii) The International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg 
Towards the end of World War Two, the British, American, Soviet and 
French Governments met at London. This conference produced the London 
Agreement on 8 August 1945. The UK, USA, USSR and France signed this 
agreement, which was supplemented by Law No. 10 issued by the Allied 
Control Council in Germany. These instruments were responsible for the 
                                                            
5 Id. at 3 
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establishment of the institutions and methods used for the trying of 
international war criminals. The Governing document produced by these 
meetings was the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 6 
The International Military Tribunal was governed by its charter which is 
composed of 30 articles. Article 7 stated that “The official position of 
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government 
departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.” 
This charter also stipulated individual responsibility in article 8 which stated 
that, “The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government 
or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine that justice so 
requires.” 
This tribunal would try suspects whose acts were across national boundaries. 
Those suspects whose acts were localised, would be tried by each of the four 
nations own war crime courts. The courts operated by the individual 
countries operated according to the procedures of the particular country. 7 
(a)The Counts and Charges 
In October 1945, indictments were served on twenty four Nazi leaders, and 
their trial – known as the Trial of the Major War Criminals – began the 
                                                            
6 Stephen's Study Room: British Military & Criminal History in the period 1900 to 1999. 
www.stephenstratford.co.uk  
7 Id. at  www.stephenstratford.co.uk 
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following month. It concluded nearly a year later, with the conviction of 
nineteen defendants and the imposition of sentence of death in twelve cases. 
The four counts which were specified by the IMT charter's Article 6 are:  
1. The conspiracy to wage aggressive war. This count alleged that there 
was a general conspiracy among a group of people to plan, organise 
and otherwise prepare for an aggressive war.  
2. The actual waging of aggressive war. This count dealt with the actual 
carrying out of an aggressive war, including the breaking of treaties, 
agreements and other international items.  
3. War Crimes. This count dealt with acts against the laws and usage of 
war. An example of this would be the killing of prisoners-of-war.  
4. Crimes against humanity. This count dealt with the acts committed 
against specific groups of people, based on their, for example, religion.  
The defendants were then charged with committing crimes covered by one of 
the counts. As required by the charter, they were issued with copies of the 
indictments and supporting documents in German.8 
The charter of the international Military tribunal had been adopted after the 
crimes had been committed, and for this reason it was attacked as constituting 
ex post facto criminalization. Rejecting such arguments, the tribunal referred 
to the Hague conventions, for the war crimes, and to the 1928 Kellogg- 
Briand pact, for crimes against peace. It also answered that the prohibition of 
                                                            
8 Id. at www.stephenstratford.co.uk. 
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retroactive crimes was a principle of justice, and that it would fly in the face 
of justice to leave the Nazi crimes unpunished. This argument was 
particularly important with respect to the category of crimes against 
humanity, for which there was little real precedent. In the case of some war 
crimes charges, the tribunal refused to convict after hearing evidence of 
similar behavior by British and American soldiers.9 
Briefly before they started their deliberations, the judges discussed the 
method of capital punishment to be used. The French judges suggested that a 
firing squad should be used for the military condemned. The Russian Judge, 
Major-General Nikitchenko fiercely opposed this idea. The accused were 
common criminals who had disgraced their military ethos and tradition. The 
judges voted that all those sentenced to death would be hanged.10 
The death sentences were carried out inside the Nuremberg Prison 
Gymnasium where a set of three gallows had been placed. The condemned 
were hanged in the order of their indictment.11 
(ii) The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)    
In the Pacific Theater, the victorious Allies established the international 
Military Tribunal for the Far East on May 3, 1946 to November 12, 1948. 
The Charter of the IMTFE is composed of 17 articles. All Japanese Class A 
war criminals were tried by the IMTF in Tokyo. Japanese war criminals were 
                                                            
9 Id. at  www.stephenstratford.co.uk 
10 Id. at  www.stephenstratford.co.uk 
11 Id. at  www.stephenstratford.co.uk 
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tried under similar provisions to those used at Nuremberg. The bench was 
more cosmopolitan, consisting of judges from eleven countries, Australia, 
Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
the Philippines, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The 
Tokyo trial lasted two and a half years, from May 1946 to November 1948. 
Other war criminals were tried in the respective victim countries. War crime 
trials were held at ten different locations in China. The Nuremberg Judges 
were appointed by the four major powers, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. 12 
Of the eighty 80 Class A war criminal suspects detained in the Sugamo 
prison after 1945, twenty-eight men were brought to trial before the IMTFE. 
The accused included nine civilians and nineteen professional military men. 13 
Joseph Keenan, the chief prosecutor representing the United States at the 
trial, issued a press statement along with the indictment: “war and treaty-
breakers should be stripped of the glamour of national heroes and exposed as 
what they really are --- plain, ordinary murderers.”14 
 (a) Jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East 
Article 5 of the IMTFE stated that: 
Jurisdiction over Persons and Offences. The Tribunal shall have the 
power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals 
                                                            
12 Id. at  www.cnd.org 
13Id. at www.cnd.org 
14Id. at www.cnd.org 
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or as members of organizations are charged with offences which 
include Crimes against Peace. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing; 
(b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or 
customs of war; 
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation 
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person 
in execution of such plan. 
 Individual responsibility was incorporated in article 6 which stated: 
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Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time, of 
an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his 
government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such 
accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but 
such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
Two (Yosuke Matsuoka and Osami Nagano) of the twenty-eight defendants 
died of natural causes during the trial.  One defendant (Shumei Okawa) had a 
mental breakdown on the first day of trial, was sent to a psychiatric ward and 
was released in 1948 a free man. The remaining twenty-five were all found 
guilty, many of multiple counts. Seven were sentenced to death by hanging, 
sixteen to life imprisonment, and two to lesser terms. All seven sentenced to 
death were found to be guilty of inciting or otherwise implicated in mass-
scale atrocities, among other counts. Three of the sixteen sentenced to life 
imprisonment died between 1949 and 1950 in prison. The remaining thirteen 
were paroled between 1954 and 1956, less than eight years in prison for their 
crimes against millions of people.  Two former ambassadors were sentenced 
to seven and twenty years in prison. One died two years later in prison. The 
other one was paroled in 1950, and was appointed foreign minister in 1954. 15 
 
                                                            
15Id. at www.cnd.org  
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4. The Ad Hoc Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda (ICTR) 
While the draft statute of an international criminal court was being 
considered in the international law commission, events compelled the 
creation of a court on an ad hoc basis in order to address the atrocities being 
committed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
The Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals are in effect joined at the hip, sharing 
not only virtually identical statutes but also some of their institutions. The 
first major judgment by the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the 
Tadic16 jurisdictional decision of 2 October 1995, clarified important legal 
issues relating to the creation of the body. It also pointed the tribunal towards 
an innovative and progressive view of war crimes law, going well beyond the 
Nuremberg precedents by declaring that crimes against humanity could be 
committed in peacetime and by establishing the punishability of war crimes 
during internal armed conflicts.17 
(i) The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Established as an ad hoc court the ICTY was created in virtue of resolution 
827 of the Security Council of the United Nations. It is located in The Hague, 
Netherlands. This resolution was adopted on the 25th of May 1993, as a 
                                                            
16  Prosecution V. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-AR72) (1997) 105 ILR 453 cited in William A. Schabas supra  note 1 at 
12 
17 William A. Schabas,  Id. at 12 
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reaction to the threat to peace and international security that grave violations 
of the humanitarian laws in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in former Yugoslavia since 1991 represented. Reports depicting 
horrendous crimes, in which thousands of civilians were being killed and 
wounded, tortured and sexually abused in detention camps and hundreds of 
thousands expelled from their homes. 18 
The ICTY was the first war crimes court created by the UN and the first 
international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. It 
was established by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.19 
The Statute of ICTY consists of 34 articles. Article 7 (2) titled ‘Individual 
Criminal Responsibility’ states that; “The official position of any accused 
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.”   
Jurisdictions of the ICTY, in accordance with the resolution, have multiple 
objectives. The main goals are: to try those individuals most responsible for 
appalling acts such as crimes against humanity- murder, torture, rape, 
enslavement, destruction of property- genocide, violation of laws or customs 
of war. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as listed in the 
Tribunal's Statute from articles 2 to 5 and also to uphold justice for the 
                                                            
18 www.icty.org 
19 www.icty.org 
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victims, and to hinder revisionism by seeking and imposing the judiciary 
truth, and to help build back peace and reconciliation in former Yugoslavia. 20 
The ICTY has charged over 160 persons, including head of state Slobodan 
Milošević. The proceedings against Slobodan Milosević were terminated due 
to his death before transfer to the Tribunal.  Also prime ministers, army 
chiefs-of-staff, interior ministers and many other high- and mid-level 
political, military and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav 
conflicts were indicted. Its indictments address crimes committed from 1991 
to 2001 against members of various ethnic groups in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. More than 60 individuals have been convicted and currently 
more than 40 people are in different stages of proceedings before the 
Tribunal. While operating at full capacity, the Tribunal is working towards 
the completion of its mandate. The ICTY aims to achieve this by 
concentrating on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders, while 
referring a certain number of cases involving intermediate and lower-ranking 
accused persons to national courts in the former Yugoslavia. This plan, 
commonly referred to as the Tribunal's 'completion strategy', foresees the 
Tribunal assisting in strengthening the capacity of national courts in the 
region to handle war crimes cases. The ICTY is made up of three main 
branches: the Chambers, the Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor.21 
 
                                                            
20 www.icty.org 
21 www.icty.org 
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(ii) The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR)  
Recognizing that serious violations of humanitarian law were committed in 
Rwanda, and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the 
Security Council expressed it’s 'grave concern at the reports indicating that 
genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda' and hence 
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by resolution 
955 of 8, November 1994. The purpose of this measure is to contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace 
in the region. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was 
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. It may also deal 
with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide- against 
the Tutsi group which was perpetrated by the Hutu- and other such violations 
of international law committed in the territory of neighbouring States during 
the same period. 22 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is governed by its Statute, 
which is annexed to Security Council Resolution 955. ICTR statute consists 
of 32 articles and it closely resembles that of the ICTY, although the war 
crimes provisions reflect the fact that the Rwandan genocide took place 
within the context of a purely internal armed conflict. Article 6(2) titled 
‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’ states that, “The official position of any 
                                                            
22 www.ictr.org 
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accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.” 
 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which the Judges adopted in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Statute, establish the necessary framework 
for the functioning of the judicial system. The Tribunal consists of three 
organs: the Chambers and the Appeals Chamber; the Office of the 
Prosecutor, in charge of investigations and prosecutions; and the Registry, 
responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative support to the 
Chambers and the Prosecutor.23 
By resolution 977 of 22 February 1995, the Security Council decided that the 
seat of the Tribunal would be located in Arusha, United Republic of 
Tanzania, whereas the Appeals Chamber is located in The Hague 
(Netherlands). The first indictments were issued in November 1995 following 
the election of the first judges. 24 
In accordance with its “Completion Strategies”, as defined in Resolutions 
1504 and 1534 of the UN Security Council, the Tribunal had concluded all its 
investigations by the end of 2004 and all of the trials at first instance should 
have been completed by the end of 2008 and what’s left of the work should 
                                                            
23 www.ictr.org 
24 www.ictr.org 
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be completed now in 2010. This must be done, even if any of the main 
suspects have still not been arrested.25 
(a) Jurisdiction 
? Ratione Materiae: genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II shall be punishable; 
? Ratione Temporis: crimes committed between 1 January and 31 
December 1994;  
? Ratione Personae et Ratione Loci: crimes committed by Rwandans 
in the territory of Rwanda and in the territory of neighboring states, 
as well as non-Rwandan citizens for crimes committed in Rwanda. 
5. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
(i) Introduction 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), governed by the Rome Statute, is the 
first permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to help 
end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community. 26 
The International Criminal Court is an independent international 
organisation, and is not part of the United Nations system. Its seat is at The 
                                                            
25www.ictr.org 
 
26 www.icc-cpi.int 
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Hague in the Netherlands. Although the Court’s expenses are funded 
primarily by States Parties, it also receives voluntary contributions from 
governments, international organisations, individuals, corporations and other 
entities.27 
(ii) Drafting of the ICC Statute 
In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly decided to pursue work 
towards the establishment of an international criminal court, taking the 
International Law Commission's (ILC) draft statute as a basis. It convened an 
Ad Hoc Committee, which met twice in 1995. The Ad Hoc Committee 
concluded that the new court was to conform to principles and rules that 
would ensure the highest standards of justice, and that these should be 
incorporated in the statute itself rather than being left to the uncertainty of 
judicial discretion. 28 
The Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court convened on 15 June 1998 in Rome, at the 
headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). More than 
160 states sent delegates to the conference, in addition to a range of 
international organizations and literally hundreds of non- governmental 
organizations.29 
                                                            
27 www.icc-cpi.int 
28 William A. Schabas, supra  note 70 at 13-15-17-18-19 and 20 
29 Id. at  
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The United States tried unsuccessfully to rally opposition, convening a 
meeting of what it had assessed as waivers'. Indeed hopes that the draft 
statute might be adopted by consensus at the final session were dashed when 
the United States exercised its right to demand that a vote be taken. The result 
was 120 in favour, with twenty one abstentions and seven votes against. The 
vote was not taken by roll call, and only the declarations made by States 
themselves indicate who voted for what. The seven countries that voted 
against the treaty were China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, 
and Yemen. Among the abstainers were several Arab and Islamic states, as 
well as a number of delegations from the Commonwealth Caribbean.30 
The magic number of sixty ratifications was reached on 11 April 2002. The 
Rome Statute which consists of 128 articles entered into force on the 1st, July 
2002. The court cannot prosecute crimes committed prior to entry into force. 
31  
Today, 110 countries have joined the court, including nearly all of Europe 
and South America, and roughly half the countries in Africa. However, these 
countries only account for a minority of the world's population. A further 38 
states have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute; article 18 (a) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)-VCLT- obliges these 
states to refrain from “acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the 
treaty.32 
                                                            
30 Id. at 
31 Id. at 
32 www.icc-cpi.int 
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(iii) Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute 1998 grants the Court jurisdiction over four 
groups of crimes, which it refers to as the “most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole”: the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The statute 
defines each of these crimes except for aggression: it provides that the court 
will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time 
as the states parties agree on a definition of the crime and set out the 
conditions under which it may be prosecuted. 
(iv) Exercise of Jurisdiction 
According to article 13 of the Rome Statute, exercise of jurisdiction is    
limited to the following circumstances: 
? where the person accused of committing a crime is a national of a 
state party (or where the person's state has accepted the jurisdiction 
of the court); 
? where the alleged crime was committed on the territory of a state 
party (or where the state on whose territory the crime was 
committed has accepted the jurisdiction of the court); or 
? where a situation is referred to the court by the UN Security 
Council. 
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(v)  Issues of Admissibility 
The ICC is intended as a court of last resort, investigating and prosecuting 
only where national courts have failed. Article 17 of the Statute provides that 
a case is inadmissible if: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is 
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted 
under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court. 
Article 20, paragraph 3, specifies that, if a person has already been tried by 
another court, the ICC cannot try them again for the same conduct unless the 
proceedings in the other court: 
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(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
or  
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international 
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
(vi) Co-operation by States not Party to Rome Statute 
One of the principles of international law is that a treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for third States pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
without their consent, and this is also enshrined in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The co-operation of the non-party States 
with the ICC has been stated in article 87 that comprises seven paragraphs. 
However, even States that have not acceded to the Rome Statute might still 
be subject to an obligation to co-operate with ICC in certain cases. When a 
case is referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council all UN member States 
are obliged to co-operate, since its decisions are binding for all of them. Also, 
there is an obligation to respect and ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law (IHL), which stems from the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I, which reflects the absolute nature of IHL. Although the 
wording of the Conventions might not be precise as to what steps have to be 
taken, it has been argued that it at least requires non-party States to make an 
effort not to block actions of ICC in response to serious violations of those 
Conventions. In relation to co-operation in investigation and evidence 
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gathering, it is implied from the Rome Statute that the consent of a non-party 
State is a prerequisite for ICC Prosecutor to conduct an investigation within 
its territory, and it seems that it is even more necessary for him to observe 
any reasonable conditions raised by that State, since such restrictions exist for 
States party to the Statute. As for the actions that ICC can take towards non-
party States that do not co-operate, the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court 
may inform the Assembly of States Parties or Security Council, when the 
matter was referred by it, when non-party state refuses to co-operate after it 
has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the court.33  
(vii)The Scope of Head of State Immunity According to the Rome Statute   
The basis of responsibility stipulated by the Rome Statute is individual 
responsibility as stated in article 25(1) and (2): 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to 
this Statute. 
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in 
accordance with this Statute. 
Hence it becomes quite obvious to lift immunity from any person who enjoys 
it as stated in article 27 of the Statute titled ‘Irrelevance of official capacity’: 
 1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as 
                                                            
33 www.wikipedia.org 
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a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, 
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person. 
There is an important practical exception, however, that can serve to shield 
certain classes of persons from prosecution. The court is prohibited pursuant 
to article 98 (1), from proceeding with a request for surrender of assistance if 
this would require a requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law as concerns a third state, unless the latter consents. 
Diplomatic immunity falls into such a category. This means that, while a 
state party to the statute cannot shelter its own head of state or foreign 
minister from prosecution by the ICC, the court cannot request the state to 
cooperate in surrender or otherwise with respect to a third state. Nothing 
prevents the State party from doing this if it so wishes, and once the head of 
state was taken into the actual custody of the court he or she would be treated 
like any other defendant. Similarly, the court is also prohibited from 
proceeding in a request for surrender that would require a state party to act 
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inconsistently with certain international agreements reached with a third 
state. 34 
The provision – article 98 (2) – was intended to ensure that a rather common 
class of treaties known as 'status of forces agreements' (or SOFAS) would not 
be undermined or neutralized by the statute. SOFAs are used to ensure that 
peacekeeping forces or troops based in a foreign country are not subject to 
the jurisdiction of that country's courts. Some ingenious lawyers in the United 
States Department of State have attempted to pervert article 98 (2), drafting 
treaties that shelter all American nationals from the Court. Several States 
parties have succumbed to Washington's pressure and agreed to such 
arrangements.35 
It is however unclear to what extent the ICC is compatible with reconciliation 
processes that grant amnesty to human rights abusers. Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute allows the Security Council to prevent the court from investigating or 
prosecuting a case, and Article 53 allows the Prosecutor the discretion not to 
initiate an investigation if he or she believes that “an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice”. Former ICC President Philippe Kirsch has said 
that "some limited amnesties may be compatible" with a country's obligations 
genuinely to investigate or prosecute under the statute.36 
It is sometimes argued that immunity is necessary to allow the peaceful 
transfer of power from abusive regimes. By denying States the right to offer 
                                                            
34 William A. Schabas, supra  note 70 at 80-81 
35Id. at 81 
36 Anthony Dworkin. Introduction in The International Criminal Court: An End to Impunity? Crimes of War Project. 
Accessed 18 September 2007 
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immunity to human rights abusers, the International Criminal Court may 
make it more difficult to negotiate an end to conflict and a transition to 
democracy. However, the United Nations and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross maintain that granting immunity to those accused of war 
crimes and other serious crimes is a violation of international law.37 
6. Conclusion 
It took the international community a long period of time to establish a 
permanent criminal court. Hence, in order to reduce the level of impunity 
from prosecution until the establishment of a permanent criminal court the 
IMT and the two ad hoc tribunals were established. It is apparent that all 
these international criminal tribunals paved the way for the further 
development of international criminal law by compelling individual 
responsibility. The difference though is that all the previous tribunals had 
limited jurisdiction to prosecute cases that are within their mandate. On the 
other hand the ICC has jurisdiction not only to lift immunity from head of 
states and their state officials -like the rest- but also to bind States which are 
not parties to the Rome Statute through the Security Council to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Here is where the controversy occurs between the 
Rome Statute and the principles of international law and in particular the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) that clearly stipulates that 
a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for third States pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. This controversy creates a dispute of whether 
                                                            
37 www.wikipedia.org 
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such clause may render the ICC jurisdiction inadmissible and hence void or 
that such clause represents an evolution in international law by repealing the 
clause from the VCLT. Even though the jurisdiction of the ICC commences 
when the State where the violations occurred is unable or unwilling to take 
action in terms of prosecution of the violators; the purpose for this is to 
achieve justice for the victims and to eliminate impunity and to stress on the 
concept of restrictive sovereignty. This concept that has been worn out by the 
establishment of the United Nations and the clear indication made in its 
charter to uphold human rights and to ensure international peace and security 
which is no longer the sole task of the State in question. Yet, this noble 
initiative made by the ICC might be ineffective in the sense that in cases of 
heads of state who are not parties to the statute by issuing an arrest warrant 
and without actual mechanisms of arrest except for the cooperation of parties 
to the statute and the universal community enshrined in the UN. Assuming 
those attempts are successful, a question imposes itself: What is the fate of 
the forum in the sense of security and order?  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
 
Head of state immunity is a principle that experienced rapid growth in the 
past centuries. It was first integrated with the principle of state immunity 
since the head of state was regarded as the mouth and hands of the state in 
metaphorically. But actually the head of state symbolizes the sovereignty of 
the state among other states. Hence, his enjoyment of immunity would come 
naturally since the state enjoys immunity. The principle of absolute state 
immunity was reigning until the 19th century when the restrictive immunity 
was introduced due to commercial transactions practiced by states. It was not 
until the second half of the 20th century that states were fully aware that they 
could be under jurisdiction of another state. States regarded immunity as a 
shield from adjudication from foreign courts and to ensure the sovereignty 
and equality of states.  
 The source of head of state immunity is customary international law. No 
treaty has been enacted on this principle. Although the FSIA and SIA enacted 
by the US and UK respectively, which adopted the restrictive state immunity 
approach, stated that the heads of state enjoyed immunity but the matter was 
not fully discussed. The US leaves the matter up to the executive authority 
when there is a law suit pending in court to evaluate the situation and decide 
whether the defendant is regarded as head of state or not. As for civil law 
countries they depend on case law for this matter and for the state immunity. 
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Thus, since both common law and civil law countries rely on customary 
international law to set principles that are binding on states in regard to head 
of state immunity and this is accomplished through case law and state activity 
on this matter.  
The raison d’être for head of state immunity is to ensure that heads of states 
are not inhibited in performing their diplomatic functions, by being arrested 
during their official visits which serves the traditional aims of sovereign 
immunity, because subjecting a state's leader to the jurisdiction of a foreign 
court infringes to some degree on that state's sovereignty. 
In the dawn of a new era after the atrocities of the Second World War, it was 
necessary to stand back and readdress the situation of impunity in regard to 
international crimes that have been committed by high commander officers 
and other high ranks in the government. It was not until the establishment of 
the IMT at Nuremburg on 8, August 1945 by the victorious Allies for the 
prosecution of the Nazis responsible for the violation of the international 
humanitarian law “Hague Law” took place. Perhaps one of the ground 
breaking principle that this Tribunal introduced was the ‘individual 
responsibility’ article that clearly condemned acts and imposed liability on 
‘head of states’ and other state officials. The only set back was that this 
article that was also included in the IMTFE, ICTY and ICTR applied only to 
the jurisdiction stated in their statutes which was mostly territorial.  
With these developments and the birth of a new branch of international law 
which is ‘international criminal law’ that upholds individual responsibility 
the position of immunity of heads of state became threatened. Recent case 
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law has differentiated the position of former and current heads of state. The 
Pinochet case marks a bold move by the House of Lords that lifted immunity 
from the former Chilean head of state for crimes against humanity that were 
committed during his tenure of office which he was knowingly responsible. 
The Law Lords believed that crimes against humanity are condemned by 
international law and are not regarded as acts which fall within the acts that 
acquire heads of states immunity. Also since the former heads of state do not 
enjoy this position anymore, exposing them to prosecution would not defeat 
the raison d’être of their functional immunity and their personal immunity 
that seized to exist once they ended their tenure of office.  
The position of the current head of state remains unsettled. It would seem that 
the initiative made by the House of Lords in regards to crimes against 
humanity and other international crimes condemned by the Geneva 
Convention IV, 1949 and hence by international law, and the obligation 
stated in the UN Charter to uphold human rights did not alter the position of 
the ICJ or the other House of Lords decisions on this matter. It seems that the 
courts vague position on the matter is highly influenced by the political 
relations between states rather than carrying out their actual functions as 
courts and that is to uphold justice under any costs and to remedy the victims. 
With the development of the ICC and the straight forward article 27 of the 
Rome Statute stated that “official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government… shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility 
under this Statute” the issue of lifting immunity from heads of states should 
be settled.    
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 This time around the long awaited permanent international criminal court has 
jurisdiction not only on parties to the treaty but also on cases referred to it by 
the UN Security Council. It is this latter point that creates a feud between 
settled principles of international law embodied in the Vienna Convention on 
Law of Treaties that clearly stipulates that a treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for third States (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). 
Regardless of the purpose of the International Criminal Court to eliminate 
impunity in respect of international crimes, the task of forcing states to be 
bound by a statute of a court that they have not ratified through the Security 
Council which the states are members of seems quite a crucial transition in 
international law in the field of international criminal law. One might 
interpret the jurisdiction of UN Security Council to refer cases to the 
International Criminal Court under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an 
exception to the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties article. 
The miraculous development of the arrest warrant issued by the International 
Criminal Court against the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on 4th March 
2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in 
Darfur region in Western Sudan when the matter was referred by the Security 
Council to the ICC (even though the Sudan is not a party state to the Rome 
Statute). This will probably answer both questions which were raised in this 
research. The first question: the situation of current heads of state accused of 
international crimes and the second question as to whether the principle of 
binding non state parties to the Rome Statute will defeat the principle of 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt incorporated in the Vienna Convention 
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on Law of Treaties? International law went a long way from state 
responsibility and arrived to very slippery grounds of individual 
responsibility in respect of heads of state. 
In light of the above findings, the following recommendations may be made  
1. To enact a treaty which focuses on head of state immunity. 
2. To realize the criticalness of lifting immunity from head of states 
in cases of international crimes in the sense that there should be a 
great deal of consideration as to the settlement and security of the 
forum that will suffer the removal of its head of state. I suggest 
that prevention measures should be applied in this situation 
before issuing an arrest warrant by a specialized team of hybrid 
experts formed by the UN to ensure neutrality in the matter and 
with representatives from both the ICC and the State in question 
in order to facilitate the task of the experts which is to ascertain 
beyond reasonable doubt that the allegations against the head of 
state are admissible.  
3. The issue of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt incorporated in 
the VCLT and the ICC’s jurisdiction on non state parties should 
be settled through an active effort by the UN. 
4. Efforts should be made by the international community to 
improve judiciaries and legal systems as a whole so that they can 
become able to try cases that involve violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law.       
  97
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
A. BOOKS 
Alebeek, Rosanne Van: The Immunity of States and Their Officials in 
International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law. New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc. (2008) 
Bantekas, Ilias: Principles of Direct and Superior Responsibility in 
International Humanitarian Law. UK: Manchester University Press. 
(2002). 
Brownlie, Ian: Principles of Public International Law, Fifth Edition. New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc. (2001) 
Cassese, Antonio: International Law. New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc. (2001) 
Cooper-Hill, James: The Law of Sovereign Immunity and Terrorism. 
USA: Oceana Publications a Division of Oxford University Press Inc. 
(2006) 
Euromoney Special Law Report. United States Law of Sovereign 
Immunity.  London: Euromoney Publications Limited (1983). 
Fox, Hazel: The Law of State Immunity. Second Edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc. (2008) 
Schabas, William A.: An Introduction To The International Criminal 
Court (Second Edition). Cambridge University Press (2004) 
  98
Schreuer, Christoph H.: State Immunity. UK: Grotius Publications 
Limited (1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  99
 
 
B. ARTICLES  
Akhavan, Payan: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment. 90s American Journal of 
International Law No. 3 (1996) 
 Bianchi, Andrea: Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case.10 
European Journal of International Law (1999) 
Caplan, Lee M.: State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A 
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory. 97 American Journal of 
International Law (2003) 
Cassese, Antonio: When May Senior Officials Be Tried for International 
Crimes: Some Comments on Congo V Belgium. European Journal of 
International Law 2002 
Ciacncio, Pietro Di: Torturer’s Manifesto? Impunity through Immunity in 
Jones v The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 30 Sydney Law Review (2008) 
Joyner, Christopher C.: Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal 
Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability. 59 Law & 
Contemporary Problems. (Autumn 1996) 
Spinedi, Marina : State Responsibility V. Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes: Terium Non Datur. 13 European Journal of 
International Law, No. 4  (2002). 
  100
  Tunks, Michael A.: Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of 
Head-of-State Immunity. 52 Duke Law Journal (2002) 
Zan, Myint: Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium: Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000; Crimes against Humanity: 'Immunity' versus 'Impunity'. 7  
South Pacific Law Journal ( 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  101
C. ELECTRONIC DATA 
http://www.icj-cij.org. Official website of the International Court of Justice 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk. Official website of the UK 
Parliament 
Kaufmann, Prof. Dr. Christine: “Human Rights”. University of Zurich. Found 
on: www.westlaw.com (2009) 
Kenneth Roth. The Case for Universal Jurisdiction. Volume 80, Number 5 ( 
September/October, 2001) www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2001/80/5    
www.cnd.org 
www.icc-cpi.int. Official website of the International Criminal Court 
www.ictr.org. Official website of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda  
www.icty.org. Official website of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia 
www.stephen-stratford.co.uk- Stephen's Study Room: British Military & 
Criminal History in the period 1900 to 1999.  
www.wikipedia.org 
 
 
 
 
